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Abstract   
 
This study provides a comprehensive literature review of audit quality and it explores three decades of audit 
research (1980 to 2010). The DeFond and Zhang (2014) framework is used to present and discuss several 
perspectives on the concept and measures of audit quality, its inherent limitations and main strengths, 
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1. Introduction 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, financial statement fraud cases by high-profile companies such as 
Xerox, Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, have emphasised the importance of credibility and integrity in 
financial reporting, and have raised serious concerns about corporate governance and audit efficacy in 
deterring and detecting financial statement fraud (Wells, 2005). More recently, the deepening of the 
financial crisis that began around 2007 triggered further questions about the role and value of the financial 
statements audit, as many financial institutions that had not received a qualified audit opinion underwent 
financial distress or, in some cases, collapsed (Sikka, 2009). Such events cast doubt on whether auditors 
lack the necessary independence, expertise, or incentives to construct a ‘true’ and ‘fair’ account of corporate 
affairs, while providing an opportunity to reflect and (re)construct the role of auditing in contemporary 
society, and a greater understanding of the day-to-day provision of audit services (Humphrey et al., 2009; 
Sikka, 2009). In short, the key drivers of audit quality were questioned and regulators of the profession 
worldwide made efforts to improve the credibility and integrity of financial reporting, and audit quality. 
We found several recent initiatives by different regulators of the audit profession reflecting efforts to 
identify the most effective way to determine and assess audit quality.  
The Framework for Audit Quality issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB, 2014) argues that, conceptually, audit quality encompasses five key elements that create an 
environment which maximize the likelihood that quality audits are performed on a consistent basis. The 
key elements are: 1) inputs (values, ethics and attitudes of auditors and their knowledge, skills, and 
experience); 2) process (the rigor of the audit process and quality control procedures); 3) outputs (reports 
and information that are formally prepared and presented by one party to another, as well as outputs that 
arise from the auditing process that are generally not visible to those outside the audited organization); 4) 
key interactions between the stakeholders within the financial reporting supply chain, and 5) context factors 
(laws and regulations and corporate governance, which could impact on the nature and quality of financial 
reporting and, audit quality).  
With a similar view, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, 2015) issued the 
Concept Release on Audit Quality Indicators revealing 28 potential indicators of audit quality that fall into 
three groups: 1) the audit professionals, including measures dealing with the availability, competence, and 
focus of those performing the audit; 2) the audit process, that includes measures about an audit firm’s tone 
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at the top and leadership, incentives, independence, attention to infrastructure, and record of monitoring 
and remediation; 3) the audit results, including financial statements, internal control, going concern, 
communications between auditors and audit committees, and enforcement and litigation. 
Released in January 2016 by the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ, 2016), the Audit Quality Indicators: 
The Journey and Path Ahead also provides insights on a potential set of audit quality indicators, that fall 
into four key areas: 1) firm leadership and tone at the top; 2) engagement team knowledge, experience, and 
workload; 3) monitoring, and 4) auditor reporting.  
As stated by PCAOB (2015), the indicators formulated in these frameworks provide stakeholders with 
insight into audit quality for their decisions and policy-making, and audit firms with additional incentives 
to compete based on their (audit) quality.  
Although the conceptualization of audit quality as a product of several “key drivers” is a current 
approach for the regulators of the audit profession, there still remains little consensus on a definition of 
audit quality, on an audit quality framework, and on the most relevant indicators of audit quality and how 
and to whom they should be communicated (CAQ, 2016). Furthermore, as Simnet et al. (2016, p.22) 
highlight, “[W]hile auditing has become a truly international profession, it is not clear how audit research 
has significantly contributed to and informed this observed phenomena”.  
In the last two decades, in parallel with a significant growth in the number and complexity of 
multinational corporations, we have witnessed a significant internationalization of the auditing profession 
and the related auditing standard-setting and regulatory processes, with continuous convergence in adoption 
of the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) (issued by the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC), through the IAASB), and the dissemination of public oversight bodies across international 
jurisdictions (Simnet et al., 2016). However, while more than 100 countries have so far adopted ISAs using 
different bases (wholesale adoption by law, wholesale adoption by standard setter, or partial adoption to 
meet the needs of a country), the U.S. has not adopted ISAs. U.S. auditors use the Statements on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) issued by the Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) when auditing non-public firms, and the PCAOB’s Auditing Standards (AS) when 
auditing publicly traded companies.1 The ISAs are principle-based standards, while SAS and AS are rules-
based standards. 
According to Linberg & Seifert (2011), there are four major differences between U.S. and international 
auditing standards that may influence audit quality, and thus, resulting in differences between U.S. and 
international studies: internal control over financial reporting, use of another auditor, going concern 
considerations, and risk assessment. SAS and ISA require testing internal controls to make sure they are 
sufficient and functional, but only the AS requires auditors to express an opinion on the effectiveness of 
the client’s internal controls over financial reporting (Linberg & Seifert, 2011). Under SAS and AS, 
auditors have option to not mention the use of other auditor or clearly mention the division of 
responsibilities. Under ISA, the main auditor cannot mention other auditors and must take full 
responsibility, even though he/she has used other auditor for part of the audit (Linberg & Seifert, 2011). 
But, the most significant differences between U.S. and international auditing standards are probably in 
going concern considerations and in risk assessment. SAS and AS define going concern period as one year 
from the date of fiscal year being audited (maximum), but ISA’s going concern period is at least one year 
but not limited to one year (Linberg & Seifert, 2011). While ISA and AS both require specific risk 
assessment procedures in order to obtain a broad understanding of the entities business risks (and operating 
and strategic risks), only ISA requires to assess how the entities respond to these risks. Furthermore, SAS 
requires auditors to assess material misstatement based on companies operating environment, and considers 
more relevant to assess fraud risk rather than integrating it into risk assessment standards (Linberg & Seifert, 
2011). 
The dichotomy between the U.S. and the international (IAASB) standard-setting process on auditing 
raises interesting questions on the cost-benefits of a particular unique policy or disclosure in different 
jurisdictions, and how different regulations influence several aspects of audit quality. Nevertheless, a recent 
review of auditing research by DeFond and Zhang (2014), while providing evidence that regulatory 
intervention has driven auditing research, also indicates that most of the auditing research has been 
conducted in the U.S. (especially, archival auditing research).  
In terms of global audit quality and audit standard-setting, William Parrett, the CEO of Deloitte, Touche, 
Tohmatsu from 2003 until 2007, said (in, Michas, 2011, p. 1733):  
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While the global auditing networks need to focus on continuous quality improvement, worldwide 
consistency [in audit quality] will remain elusive unless regulators and standard setters are equally 
committed to achieving a greater degree of uniformity in the professional environments, including the 
regulatory regimes, in which auditors work. The varying environments create enormous challenges to 
the audit function, including the differing accounting and auditing standards, the quality of regulation 
and degree of oversight and enforcement, and auditor qualifications.  
Michas (2011) argues that global auditors are not able to provide consistent audit quality across 
countries due to large differences in audit professional environments worldwide, and that it is important to 
investigate these issues empirically. Boolaky and Soobaroyen (2017) further indicate that specific national 
economic, social, legal, cultural and political systems interact in different ways with accounting and 
auditing developments, which may generate particular accounting and auditing outcomes and/or practices. 
Therefore, as Simnet et al. (2016) highlight, auditing research that has examined a specific international 
setting or settings can inform audit practice, theory, standard setting, and regulation worldwide. 
Additionally, research that examines audit quality across multiple countries also has the ability to examine 
why certain regulations may work better in certain jurisdictions than others, and has the potential to better 
inform international standard setters, by exploring the impact of contextual factors on audit quality, 
including differences in cultural factors, litigation environment, and audit laws and regulations (Gordon et 
al., 2013; Simnet et al., 2016). 
The fact that there is little consensus about what are the most relevant and efficient proxies to measure 
audit quality, the high concentration of auditing research in the U.S., and the limited amount of evidence-
based analysis of auditing as a global profession, motivated us to perform a comprehensive review of studies 
on audit quality, based on a duality analysis – U.S. studies versus international studies on audit quality, 
while considering single and cross-country studies within the international context. 
Grounded on the DeFond and Zhang (2014) framework, which divides the audit quality indicators into 
input-based and output-based measures of audit quality, we analyse and discuss the most common proxies 
used to measure audit quality, bearing in mind the context of U.S. versus international literature. For each 
audit quality indicator, we provide a summary of the findings; present and discuss the data sources, the 
methodological approaches used, and the challenges that are faced by the U.S. and international auditing 
research on audit quality. We further present and discuss the main strengths and the inherent limitations of 
each measure of audit quality. 
 We use the literature of the past three decades (1980-2010). The initial reference for our research are 
the early years of the eighties, because the most widely cited definition of audit quality dates from that time 
(DeAngelo, 1981). We first identified key research papers on audit quality, and then we conducted a deep 
search for articles related to audit quality in research journals from sources such as Google Scholar, ABI 
Inform Global - ProQuest, Jstor, B-on, EBSCO, ScienceDirect, Wiley Online Library, Taylor and Francis 
Online Journals, and the Social Science Research Network. Within each bibliographic database, we used 
keywords, such as ‘audit quality’ and ‘auditor quality’ (or similar), to search and identify relevant papers 
(when possible, the search was made using the search option ‘title, abstract and full text’). To be selected, 
an article always had to contain the keywords in the title, the abstract, or full text. Similar to Bing et al. 
(2014), we also searched on Google for relevant documents issued by international regulatory bodies. Our 
review covers more than 180 articles from 36 accounting and auditing (and management) journals. The 
journals with the greatest coverage in terms of number of articles used in this research are: The Accounting 
Review (32 articles); Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory (23 articles); Journal of Accounting & 
Economics (17 articles); Contemporary Accounting Research (15 articles); Journal of Accounting Research 
(13 articles); Managerial Auditing Journal (12 articles); Accounting Horizons (11 articles); Journal of 
Accounting & Public Policy (9 articles); European Accounting Review (8 articles). In Appendix 1, we 
provide a Table containing detailed data on the journals that were used in our review. 
To our knowledge, the current research includes nine studies reviewing audit quality literature, which 
were performed by Francis (2004; 2011a), Watkins et al. (2004), Hussein and MohdHanefah (2013), 
Knechel et al. (2013), Bing et al. (2014), DeFond and Zhang (2014), Tepalagul and Lin (2015), and Simnet 
et al. (2016).  
Francis (2004) reviewed empirical research on audit quality from 1980 to 2004, mainly from the U.S., 
and in the audit services market of the listed companies, and located past research according to the approach 
used to analyse audit quality.  
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In their synthesis, Watkins et al. (2004) located prior research on audit quality for two segments: 1) 
studies investigating the incentives for quality-differentiated audits (exploring the demand/supply drivers 
for audit quality) and, 2) studies analysing the products of audit quality.  
Francis (2011a) took a supply-side perspective of audit quality and focused on archival-based audit 
research without exploring behavioural, experimental, and survey method research, and limited his 
attention to studies published in North American journals.  
The Hussein and MohdHanefah (2013) paper makes a synthetic review of studies using the following 
proxies of audit quality: audit firm size, litigation, auditor tenure, non-audit services, industry experience, 
and peer review. While they somehow discuss both the arguments for and against using those audit quality 
measures, they do not identify the inherent limitations of all the proxies.  
Knechel et al. (2013) developed a framework for synthesizing and understanding research related to 
audit quality, that includes linkages across the primary attributes of the audit (incentives, uniqueness, 
process, uncertainty, and judgment), and among the different aspects of the audit-inputs, process, outcomes, 
and context (they explore archival-based, behavioural, experimental, and survey method audit research 
from an international perspective).  
The synthesis made by Bing et al. (2014) is based on the definition and proxies applied by researchers 
to measure the quality of audit. They selected literature from fifty research journals and they classified the 
definitions of audit quality into direct and indirect, and discussed their implications respectively. Then, they 
reviewed around twenty audit quality proxies which were grouped into five main categories: earnings 
quality proxies, auditor characteristics (related to competence), independence related proxies, market 
perceptions related proxies, and other proxies.  
DeFond and Zhang (2014) provided a review of archival auditing research on audit quality. They limited 
the scope to studies published in the major accounting journals, from 1996 through to 2013, and they 
organized the review around an economics-based framework that examines the supply and demand forces 
that shape the audit market. They structured the discussion around four questions: 1) what is audit quality?, 
2) what drives client demand for audit quality?, 3) what drives auditor supply of audit quality?, and 4) what 
are the regulators’ concerns about audit quality?  
Tepalagul and Lin (2015) conducted a literature review related to auditor independence and audit 
quality, but they limited the scope of their search to the nine leading journals related to auditing. They 
structured the review based on four main threats to auditor independence: 1) client importance, 2) non-audit 
services, 3) auditor tenure, and 4) client’s affiliation with CPA firms.  
More recently, Simnet et al. (2016) reviewed 130 international archival auditing and assurance research 
articles, but they limited their sample to studies that were published in eight leading accounting and auditing 
journals for 1995–2014. They coded the international archival auditing research against the five key 
elements of the IAASB’s (2014) Framework for Audit Quality, providing a summary of the findings and 
outlining how they can inform standard setters and regulators, and also discussed the measures of audit 
quality, data sources used, and methodological approaches.  
Our literature review contributes to the existing research on audit quality. It complements and extends 
the prior syntheses on audit quality by providing a comprehensive analysis of the audit quality concept and 
the measures, from a global perspective. The scope of our research was not limited to archival auditing 
research and to the traditional/most influential journals related to auditing. Rather, our review includes 
literature on audit quality that used different research methods, drawing from a large scope of international 
scientific journals and from a worldwide perspective. More importantly, our paper distinguishes itself from 
the previously mentioned syntheses, because the analysis and discussion of the measures of audit quality is 
made within the context of the U.S. versus international literature, and from an international perspective, 
we further explore single and cross-country studies. For each category of audit quality indicators, we 
provide tables where studies are grouped according to their U.S./international provenance (and single 
versus cross-country studies), the specific measure of audit quality they use, and their purpose (the main 
findings are also presented).  
This paper is of interest to a number of parties, including researchers, practitioners, standard setters and 
regulators, and all those interested in understanding audit quality. We map the U.S. and international audit 
research undertaken from 1980-2010 according to the DeFond and Zhang (2014) framework (based on the 
duality input-based and output-based measures of audit quality), in order to help inform interested parties 
on the evolution of the audit quality research from a global perspective, by analyzing how the proxies for 
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audit quality, the data sources, and the methodological approaches used have evolved over time and the 
challenges they pose, and by providing information on the degree of consistency in evidence collected 
worldwide by studies on audit quality. By comparing studies that examined audit quality in the U.S, with 
those from a specific international setting, or across multiple countries, it has the potential to inform 
researchers, audit practice, standard setters and regulators worldwide, as to why certain rules may work 
better in certain jurisdictions than others, and about the impact of country-level institutional factors on audit 
quality, including legal and regulatory systems, economic, political, cultural and religious factors, the 
development of audit profession, and the development and importance of equity markets. Our review also 
identifies areas that have been researched extensively and areas with opportunities for future research. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyses and critiques the conceptualization of audit quality. 
Section 3, revises and discusses the proxies that have been used to measure audit quality, using a U.S. 
versus international literature basis and provides syntheses of studies on audit quality. Section 4 concludes 
the study. 
 
2. Defining Audit Quality   
 
From all the attempts to define audit quality in the past, none have resulted in a definition that has 
achieved universal recognition and acceptance, because audit quality is, in essence, a complex and multi-
faceted concept (IAASB, 2011; PCAOB, 2013; CAQ, 2016).  
From a practitioner’s perspective, audit quality is defined in relation to the degree to which the audit 
conforms to applicable auditing standards, and promotes a reasonable level of assurance on the truth and 
fairness of the financial statements for users (IFAC, 2009: ISA 200). From a research perspective, 
DeAngelo (1981) presented a widely cited definition, in which audit quality is viewed as the joint 
probabability of detecting and reporting material misstatements. 
According to DeAngelo (1981, p. 186), audit quality is “(…) the market-assessed joint probability that 
a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting system, and (b) report the breach”. 
DeAngelo’s definition highlighted two important aspects of audit quality: first, the competence of the 
auditor, which determines how likely a misstatement will be detected; and second, the auditor’s 
independence/objectivity, which determines what the auditor is likely to do about a detected misstatement 
(Knechel, 2009). The expression “market-assessed joint probability” refers to the market perception of 
auditors’ competence and independence, which was captured by DeAngelo through the audit firm size. 
DeAngelo grounded its definition of audit quality on the product-differentiation hypothesis, based on the 
observation that large audit firms have “more to lose” by failing to report a discovered material 
misstatement in the client’s records (Watkins et al., 2004).  
While the DeAngelo’s definition has been considered the classic concept of audit quality, several 
limitations have been associated with it. To Knechel et al. (2013), the definition suffers from two main 
problems: 1) it has not been reconciled with the audit risk model, which is used to guide the audit and 
reflects the auditor’s perceptions, and 2) the perception of market participants can be erroneous. DeFond 
and Zhang (2014) further argue that DeAngelo portrays auditing as a binary process, with the auditor’s role 
reduced to simple detection and reporting of mechanical violations of the generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). While there is no doubt that auditors are charged with assuring the correctness of 
financial statements, DeAngelo’s characterization understates the benefits of a high level of audit quality, 
which extends well beyond the simple detection and reporting of GAAP violations to assuring financial 
reporting quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Consistently, Francis (2011a) states that DeAngelo’s 
definition provides no insight about the multiple factors that affect an auditor’s capacity to detect 
misstatements, and that the definition implicitly defines fraud, which means that an auditor who knowingly 
fails to report a material misstatement has committed fraud and this is a crime in some countries, namely 
in the U.S.. 
Linked with DeAngelo’s definition, some researchers conceive audit quality in terms of audit failures, 
and focus on defining ‘‘poor audit quality’’. Under this conceptualization, audit quality is related to the 
level of assurance provided by an audit, and is inversely related to audit failures, being thus defined as the 
probability that financial statements contain no material misstatements (Titman and Trueman, 1986; 
Palmrose, 1988; Lee et al., 1999). Defining audit quality in terms of failure is appealing because it is easy 
to operationalize the definition (Knechel et al., 2013). However, while poor audit quality is observable with 
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hindsight, if an engagement results in litigation or a claim of malpractice against the audit firm (Casterella 
et al., 2009), there are relatively few cases of detectable audit failures (Francis 2011a).  
Carcello et al. (2002) also define audit quality in terms of the level of assurance provided by an audit, 
but they limit the concept to audit effort, by indicating that audit quality is directly linked to the amount of 
audit work. As in DeAngelo’s conceptualization of audit quality, this definition does not provide a 
comprehensive image about the multiple factors that affect the auditor’s work (Francis, 2011a). 
As stated by Bedard et al. (2010), taken together, the displayed definitions reveal the importance of 
various aspects of audit quality: adherence to professional standards, auditor effort, and auditor 
independence. However, each of these definitions articulates the construct quite differently. 
Grounded on the criticisms associated with earlier definitions of audit quality, in which prior concepts 
are suspected of being incomplete and not broad enough, Francis (2011a) and DeFond and Zhang (2014) 
claim that audit quality must be conceptualized as a theoretical continuum ranging from very low to very 
high audit quality. Under this reasoning, one must expect high quality auditors to evaluate not only whether 
the client’s accounting choices are in technical compliance with GAAP, but also how faithfully the financial 
statements reflect the firm’s underlying economic activities (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). DeFond and Zhang 
(2014, p. 276) go further and define higher audit quality as “greater assurance that the financial statements 
faithfully reflect the firm’s underlying economics, conditioned on its financial reporting system and innate 
characteristics”. 
As Knechel et al. (2013) highlight, there is currently no unified definition of audit quality. The 
perception of audit quality depends on whose eyes one looks through, that is, all stakeholders in the financial 
reporting process can have different views as to what is audit quality (Knechel et al., 2013). This diversity 
of views is derived from the fact that audit quality itself is not directly observable (Moizer, 1997). 
According to the IAASB (2011), the context in which an audit is undertaken is continually evolving to keep 
pace with changes in the business environment, financial reporting standards, regulation and technology. 
Thus, auditing is an activity that evolves over time, and the pursuit of audit quality, therefore, is not a 
program with a definitive outcome (IAASB, 2011). Knechel (2009) supports this view and further indicates 
that the difficulty in capturing audit quality comes from the fact that auditing is a professional service with 
uncertain outcomes executed by individuals in response to idiosyncratic client conditions. The audit process 
is designed to assess the likelihood of material misstatements and to reduce the likelihood of undetected 
and uncorrected misstatements to an “appropriate” assurance level. Yet, the level of assurance is 
unobservable and the audit risk model does not assume perfect assurance. Moreover, two audits are not 
identical: the characteristics and the risk profile of each client are different, the resources needed to conduct 
each audit are different, the personnel assigned to an audit vary from engagement to engagement, and even 
the attitudes, attention, and level of care vary daily for a given auditor (Knechel, 2009).  
Following the concept of “key drivers of audit quality” shared by several regulators of the audit 
profession worldwide, the CAQ (2016) highlights that determining audit quality is more art than science, 
and that exploring the context and relevance of certain indicators is critical to obtaining a deeper 
understanding of the quality of a particular audit. Nevertheless, this organism also recognizes that the 
potential indicators of audit quality cannot by themselves lead to a holistic understanding of audit quality. 
DeFond and Zhang (2014) further observe that, while the literature uses a large number of proxies to 
measure audit quality, there is no consensus on which measures are best, and little guidance on how to 
evaluate them. To address this issue, in the next section, we draw on the framework provided by DeFond 
and Zhang (2014), by considering the inputs and outputs of the audit process, and we evaluate and critique 
the commonly used audit quality proxies, using a U.S. versus international literature approach.  
 
3. Audit Quality Units of Analysis – U.S. versus International Literature Perspective 
 
Using a U.S. versus international literature perspective, in this section we analyse and discuss the most 
commonly used proxies to measure audit quality grounded on the DeFond and Zhang (2014) framework, 
which divides the audit quality surrogates into input-based and output-based measures of audit quality.  
 
3.1. Input-Based Measures of Audit Quality 
 
According to Francis (2011a), the two inputs to the audit process are the people who perform audits and 
the audit tests that are used to gather evidence. Thus, the inputs are primarily reflected in the individual 
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characteristics of the audit team such as professional skepticism, knowledge, and expertise, and, overall, it 
is expected that improvements in the inputs to the audit process should lead to improvements in other 
indicators of audit quality (i.e., outcomes) (Knechel et al., 2013). However, as claimed by Knechel et al. 
(2013), the inputs required to effectively carry out an audit may vary substantially across audit 
engagements, due to the riskiness of audits and the idiosyncratic nature of audit engagements. Client-related 
incentives, such as client retention and internal economic pressures in audit firms, can also threaten the 
quality of an auditor’s judgments and, thus, audit quality. Francis (2011a) further states that, while we might 
reasonably assume that auditors are competent based on general education requirements and CPA licensing, 
the fact remains that we know very little about the people who conduct audits. Accordingly, there is no 
prescriptive level of inputs designed to yield a desired level of auditor assurance; rather, the level of inputs 
is qualitative and based on the auditor’s professional judgment (Knechel et al., 2013).  
Next we discuss two main categories of input-based proxies commonly used in the literature, which are 
based on actual observed characteristics: 1) auditor–client contracting features, in particular, audit fees, and 
2) auditor-specific characteristics such as auditors’ brand name or size and industry specialization. 
 
The auditor–client contracting features – audit fees 
 
In 1976, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting, and Management provided data 
suggesting the existence of monopolistic practices by the Big Eight auditors, and that more activist 
regulation of the audit industry was needed (Nichols and Smith, 1983). Given these findings, in 1980, 
Dopuch and Simunic (in Nichols and Smith, 1983: 534) examined a wide variety of evidence and concluded 
that the auditing industry in the U.S. was competitive. In a subsequent paper, in 1982, Dopuch and Simunic 
(in Nichols and Smith, 1983: 534) argued that many of the apparent monopolistic characteristics of the 
industry could be explained by product-differentiation. Their hypothesis was that different audit firms (Big 
N/non-Big N) provide audit services which are perceived by investors to be different in quality (Nichols 
and Smith, 1983).  
Based on Dopuch and Simunic’s “product-differentiation hypothesis”, several authors theorized that 
higher fees charged by larger audit firms reflect a higher quality of audit services. They argued that it is 
reasonable to assume that the brand name price premium implies a deep audit work, more audit hours and/or 
the use of more specialized audit staff. Table 1 provides a synopsis of studies that used audit fees as 
surrogate for audit quality. 
 
Table 1. Input–based measures of audit quality (AQ) – Audit fees  
AQ 
Measure  
Purpose U.S. Studies 
International Studies 
Main Findings 
Single country Cross-country 
Audit 
fees 
To study factors 
determining AQ 













– listed firms; 
Simon (1985) –
listed firms; 
Palmrose (1986);  
Francis and 
Simon (1987) – 
listed firms;  
Ashbaugh et al., 
(2003) 
 




Whittington (1994) - 
UK listed firms;  
Craswell et al. 
(1995) – Australian 
listed firms;  
DeFond et al. (2000) 
– Hong Kong listed 
firms;  
Ireland and Lennox 
(2002) - UK listed 
firms 
 
It was found significant evidence of a fee premium 
of Big N auditors, when compared to non-Big N 
auditors, thereby validating the product 
differentiation hypothesis. 
Antle et al. 
(2006) – listed 
firms 
Francis and Stokes 
(1986) – Australian 
listed firms;   
Seetharaman et al. 
(2002) - UK firms; 
Chaney et al. (2004) 
– UK firms;   
Antle et al. (2006) – 
UK listed firms 
 
Results do not confirmed the existence of a Big N 
auditor fee premium. 
2) provision of non-
audit services 
Simunic (1984) 




Joint provision of audit and non-audit services 
resulted in a positive information spillover and 
efficiency gains for auditor and client. 
Note: Whenever there is no reference of the type of firms, it means authors used unlisted companies.                                           (Continued) 
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Table 1. Input–based measures of audit quality (AQ) – Audit fees - Continued 
AQ 
Measure  
Purpose U.S. Studies 
International Studies 
Main Findings 
Single country Cross-country 
Audit 
fees 
To study factors 




















No evidence was found of an audit fee premium for 
industry specialist auditors, in a sample of utilities 
and insurance companies. 
 
Craswell et al. 
(1995) – Australian 
listed firms;  
DeFond et al. (2000) 
– Hong Kong listed 
firms 
 
The auditors’ industry specialization significantly 
explains the fee premium of Big N auditors. 
 
Ferguson and Stokes 
(2002) - Australian 
listed firms 
 
Limited support for a positive relation between Big 
N auditors industry expertise and audit fee 
premiums. 
Casterella et al. 
(2004) 
  
Fee premiums for industry specialization arise for 
Big N auditors when clients have low bargaining 
power. 
Francis et al. 
(2005) – listed 
firms 
Ferguson et al. 
(2003) - Australian 
listed firms 
 
It was found a positive association between a fee 
premium for Big N auditors and auditors’ industry 
expertise, but only when auditor was the industry 
specialist leader at the city and the national level. 
  
Carson (2009) 
– listed firms 
from 62 
countries 
Global industry specialists attracted a highly 
significant, positive premium for audit fees, in 
addition to that received by global audit firm 
networks. 
There were significant fee premiums associated 
with national industry leaders. 
National U.S. auditors’ industry leaders also 
received fee premiums outside the U.S. market. 





O’Sullivan (2000) – 
UK listed firms 
 
A large proportion of non-executive directors 
significantly increased audit fees. No evidence that 
higher ownership concentration significantly 
impacts on audit fees. 
  
Rusmin et al. 






No statistical linkage was found between corporate 
governance mechanisms of the client and audit fees. 
Higher ownership concentration of the client firm 
resulted in higher audit fees. 
5) countries’ legal and 
regulatory regime 
  
Choi et al. 
(2008) – firms 
from 15 
countries 
The fee premiums of Big N auditors became smaller 
as the countries’ legal and regulatory regimes 
changed from weaker to stronger regimes. 
Countries’ legal and regulatory regimes (and 
litigation environment) are causal factors of audit 
effort and audit pricing.  
Note: Whenever there is no reference of the type of firms, it means authors used unlisted companies. 
DeFond and Zhang (2014) highlight that audit fees are used as a proxy for audit quality because they 
are expected to measure the auditor’s effort, which is an input to the audit process that is intuitively related 
to audit quality.  However, auditors cannot unilaterally charge higher fees for additional effort unless there 
is a corresponding increase in client demand for the additional effort. As a result, audit fees are the outcome 
of both supply and demand factors of audit quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). 
Using audit fees as a measure of audit quality, several U.S. and international single country studies 
tested whether audit quality is associated with the auditors’ size and auditors’ industry specialization, but 
empirical results exhibit inconsistencies and uncertainties.  
Table 1 provides information that shows that, while some studies based on U.S., UK, and Australia data 
confirm the product-differentiation hypothesis (e.g., Simon, 1985; Palmrose, 1986; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; 
Pong and Whittington, 1994; Craswell et al., 1995; Ireland and Lennox, 2002), other studies, using data 
from the same countries, do not support the existence of a Big N auditor fee premium (Francis and Stokes; 
1986; Seetharaman et al., 2002; Chaney et al., 2004; Antle et al., 2006). 
With regard to the effect of auditors’ industry specialization on audit pricing, empirical results are also 
mixed. U.S. studies generally suggest limited support for the presence of an audit fee premium for industry 
specialist auditors (Palmrose, 1986; Pearson and Trompeter, 1994; Casterella et al., 2004), or show that 
national industry leadership by itself does not result in an audit fee premium for Big N auditors 
(simultaneous leadership at the national and city levels is required) (Francis et al., 2005). Two studies using 
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data from Australia and Hong Kong listed firms reveal that auditors’ industry specialization significantly 
explains the fee premium of Big N auditors (Craswell et al., 1995; DeFond et al., 2000), but two subsequent 
studies with Australian listed firms found limited support for the existence of a fee premium for the largest 
audit firms (Ferguson and Stokes, 2002) and reveal that only national and city-specific industry leadership 
jointly affect Big N auditors pricing (Ferguson et al., 2003).  
The inconsistencies in the results of the audit pricing models described above may be derived from the 
changes that occur in market conditions over time and/or by the size differences between the U.S., the 
Australian, the UK and the Hong Kong audit markets, or even by the type of firms that are included in the 
samples (Casterella et al., 2004). Another issue is that the results of these models are highly sensitive to the 
type of audit fee or auditor industry specialization measures that are used (Hay and Jeter, 2011; Audousset-
Coulier et al., 2016). Audit fees are not always publicly available, leading researchers to use a variety of 
audit fee surrogates (such as client size or number of clients), and measures of auditor industry 
specialization are imperfect, suffer from econometric and conceptual problems, and fail to capture the 
complexity of the audit industry specialization concept properly (Audousset-Coulier et al., 2016).2 
Additionally, most of these research models can suffer from omitted variables bias, as audit pricing can be 
affected by other factors that are omitted from the models, or even suffer from spurious correlation, or from 
endogenous auditor choice. As reported by Ireland and Lennox (2002), while most of these studies treated 
auditor choice as exogenous, the effects of auditor selection bias on audit fees may be statistically 
significant, and thus, they should be controlled for. Choi et al. (2008) argue that audit fee studies conducted 
in single-country settings leave unresolved the question of what institutional factors drive cross-country 
variations in audit fees, and how these factors influence the magnitude of the Big N auditors’ premium. We 
encourage future research using better specified models, that control for a large number of variables that 
may affect audit pricing (including country- or city-level contextual factors), and the use of specific 
techniques to address endogeneity econometric concerns (such as including reference to the Hausman test, 
the use of fixed effects models, among other techniques). We further recommend the use of complementary 
measures of audit fees.  
In terms of cross-country studies using audit fees as an indicator of audit quality, Carson (2009) used 
the data of listed firms from 62 countries and tested whether audit quality is associated with auditors’ 
industry specialization, concluding that there are returns to global audit firm networks from investments in 
industry specializations, and significant fee premiums associated with national industry leaders. The authors 
also show that the national U.S. auditors’ industry leaders also receive fee premiums outside of the U.S. 
market. Two other studies explored the effects of client firms’ governance mechanisms and ownership 
structure, and countries’ legal and regulatory regimes on audit quality. Rusmin et al. (2009) analysed data 
from listed firms from Australia, Hong Kong and Malaysia, concluding that, while a higher ownership 
concentration in the client firms resulted in higher audit fees, the corporate governance mechanisms of the 
client firms have no impact on audit pricing. Choi et al. (2008) used a sample of firms from 15 countries, 
and demonstrated that fee premiums of Big N auditors became smaller as the countries’ legal and regulatory 
regimes changed from weaker to stronger regimes.  
One advantage of a cross-country study in this research field is the ability to exploit international 
variation in terms of audit pricing causal factors. However, as Gordon et al. (2013) argue, there are many 
different sources of variation across countries, such as market differences based on economic development, 
growth, and investment opportunities, variations in culture, religion, political, legal and regulatory systems, 
that should be considered when making research design choices in this type of studies. Simmnet et al. 
(2016) highlight that endogeneity concerns are a significant challenge in this sort of research, as it is often 
difficult to solely attribute the results to the variables being examined. From an econometric perspective, 
endogeneity can have several dimensions, including (correlated) omitted variable bias, simultaneous 
equation bias, and variables measurement bias (Simmnet et al., 2016).   
In terms of the level of analysis, a cross-country study may be designed at a firm- or country- level. 
Firm-level data provide larger samples (resulting in higher explanatory power of empirical tests) and a 
micro-level analysis, allowing the examination of firm-level incentives (Gordon et al., 2013). Country-level 
data provide macro-level analysis and offer insights into aggregate country level characteristics, but it 
typically results in smaller sample sizes (reducing the power of the empirical tests), and the aggregation of 
firm-specific data can result in different and potentially incorrect inferences (Gordon et al., 2013). In 
relation to the research design, in terms of data and sample collection in cross-country studies, researchers 
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must address concerns about differences in firm size and industry composition across countries in order to 
ensure that samples are representative of each country (Gordon et al., 2013).      
The three cross-country studies described in this section were designed to conduct firm-level analysis. 
Two of them (Carson, 2009; Rusmin et al., 2009), only included a country indicator variable to control for 
institutional differences across countries. Choi et al. (2008) went further and developed a model where they 
controlled for the effects of country’s legal regime on audit pricing and the Big N auditors premium, and 
how these pricing effects change as the legal regime shifts across countries. In their model, they controlled 
for the strictness of a country’s legal regime (by partitioning the sample into strong legal-regime and weak 
legal-regime countries), but they also included several country-level factors that may cause variations in 
audit fees across countries (gross domestic product; foreign direct investment; the importance of each equity 
market; the required level of financial statement disclosures, and the inverse Mills ratio to control for 
potential endogeneity problems associated with auditor choice). Fixed effects for industries and years were 
also included to control for potential variations in audit fees across industries and over time. 
We strongly recommend future research on audit pricing determinants using cross-country studies, but 
researchers need to be aware that the validity and strength of conclusions drawn in these studies are a 
function of the research design choices, and that key issues specific to cross-country research include 
identifying an appropriate population to study, and a suitable sample selection criteria and methodology 
(Gordon et al., 2013). A good research model will include several variables that control for country-
institutional factors that may drive cross-country variations in audit fees (and the Big N auditor premium). 
In addition to the variables accounted for by the model proposed by Choi et al. (2008), country-level 
political, cultural and religious factors may be included (whenever possible, contextual factors could be 
measured at the region or city-level). The country-level development of the audit profession may be an 
important factor to be included, as it may influence audit quality (Michas, 2011).3 Endogeneity concerns 
should be accounted for from an econometric perspective by using specific techniques, such as the two-
stage least squares with instrumental variables, the Heckman selection models, propensity score matching, 
fixed effects models, and (quasi-) natural experimental settings (Simmnet et al., 2016).    
Audit fees can have advantages in measuring audit quality. As DeFond and Zhang (2014) argue, they 
are continuous and thus capture subtle variations in quality. However, the mixed evidence on the existence 
and magnitude of a Big N auditor fee premium across countries raises at least three questions that 
researchers must take into consideration when performing studies using audit fees as a proxy for audit 
quality. Audit fee premiums, if they exist, are due to monopolistic behaviour or evidence of greater 
monitoring effort (Watkins et al., 2004)? If in addition to capturing audit effort, audit fees also capture risk 
premium and improved audit efficiency, an increase in audit fees can be unambiguously interpreted as in 
increase in audit quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014)? If audit fees capture the joint outcome of both supply 
and demand factors (DeFond and Zhang, 2014), to what extent the existence of audit fees premiums or 
higher audit fees can be clearly understood as higher audit quality? Given the inconsistencies and 
uncertainties in empirical results exhibited by auditing price models, and the inherent methodological 
concerns of these models, the existence of audit fee premiums is not a guarantee of higher levels of audit 
quality. 
 
The auditor-specific characteristics  
 
DeAngelo (1981) used the audit firm size (brand name) as a surrogate for audit quality and developed 
a concept of audit quality which has been deemed a classic and the most cited definition of audit quality by 
audit researchers. Following on her study, many other researchers used the audit firm’s brand name or size 
as an indicator of audit quality. This concept of audit quality assumes that large audit firms have competent 
human resources working there and more reputational capital to protect (Francis and Krishnan, 1999). 
Concerning auditor-specific characteristics, several studies also used the auditors’ industry expertise as a 
proxy for audit quality, assuming that specialist auditors are expected to have greater competency and 
stronger reputation incentives to provide high audit quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014).    





Table 2. Input–based measures of audit quality (AQ) – Auditor-specific characteristics 
AQ Measure Purpose U.S. Studies 
International Studies 





Brand Name  
(Big N/non-
Big N auditor)  
 
To analyse the relationship 
between AQ (auditors’ 
brand name) and: 





   
 
A positive association between Big N auditors and   
firms’ agency costs was found. 
2) Audit reporting accuracy  
Barbadillo et 
al. (2004) - 
Spanish 
firms; 





When compared to non-Big N, Big N auditors 
revealed a higher propensity to issue a going-
concern (a modified) audit opinion for distressed 
firms or firms presenting higher levels of earnings 
management.  
3) Market reaction 
 
Nichols and 
Smith (1983) – 
listed firms 
  
No significant differences were found in positive 
market reactions between changes from a non-Big 
N to a Big N auditor. 
Beatty (1989) – 
listed firms 
  
The Big N auditors’ clients exhibited lower 
returns in Initial Public Offerings (IPO) (as 
opposed to non-Big N auditors’ clients).  
Teoh and Wong 
(1993) 
  
It was found higher Earnings Response 
Coefficients (ERC) for Big N auditors’ clients, as 
opposed to non-Big N auditors’ clients. 
Behn et al. 
(2008) 
  
Big N auditors were associated with better 
forecasting performance by analysts. 
 
Hussainey 
(2009) – UK 
firms  
 
Investors of profitable clients of Big N auditors 
anticipated better future earnings, as opposed to 
those of profitable non-Big N auditors’ client 
firms. 
4) Investment opportunities Lai (2009)   
Firms with high investment opportunities were 
more likely to hire Big N auditors. 
5) Financial decisions 
 
Chang et al. 
(2009) – listed 
firms 
  
The Big N auditors’ clients were more likely to 
issue equity as opposed to debt, when compared 
to clients of non-Big N auditors. 
 





Small and medium-sized clients of Big N auditors 
paid lower interest rates, than non-Big N auditors’ 
clients. 
6) financial reporting 
quality 
 
Aharony et al. 
(1993) - listed 
firms 
  Weak evidence that earnings management was 
related to the quality of the auditors (Big N/non-
Big N auditor) employed by IPO firms.  
Becker et al. 
(1998); Francis 




Clients of Big N auditors presented lower 
discretionary accruals than clients of Non-Big N 
auditors.  
Lai (2009)   
Big N auditors constrained efficiently 
discretionary accruals in clients with high 
investment opportunities, as opposed to non-Big 
N auditors. 
Jordan et al. 
(2010) – listed 
firms 
  Clients of Big N auditors showed no major signs 
of earnings manipulation to achieve users’ 
reference points in earnings per share (EPS), as 
opposed to clients of non-Big N auditors. 
 





The IPO clients of Big N auditors voluntarily 
provided information about expected earnings, as 




(2004) – UK 
listed firms 
 
Big N auditors were not negatively related with 
less earnings management in client firms. 
 





Big N auditors were related to less earnings 










There was no evidence of an international Big N 
audit quality effect in Europe. Stricter audit 
environments reduced the magnitude of earnings 
management. 
 
Note: Whenever there is no reference of the type of firms, it means authors used unlisted companies.                                            (Continued) 
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Table 2. Input–based measures of audit quality (AQ) – Auditor-specific characteristics - Continued 





Single country Cross-country 
Auditors’ 





To analyse the 
relationship between AQ 





Chia et al. 





Only Big N auditors significantly constrained the 












Francis and Wang 




Earnings quality increased for the Big N auditors’ 
clients, in countries with higher investor 
protection regimes (smaller abnormal accruals; 
greater likelihood of reporting losses, and greater 
earnings conservatism). Earnings quality of 
clients of the non-Big N auditors was unaffected 
by different investor protection regimes.  
  
Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen 
(2008) – firms 
from six European 
countries 
Only in higher tax alignment countries, Big N 
auditors constrained more earnings management 
than non-Big N auditors. In countries with 




(2009) – French 
listed firms 
 
The presence of Big N auditors reduced the 






Big N auditors promoted conditional 
conservatism, thus increasing the contracting 
efficiency of their clients. For high levels of 
litigation and reputational risk, Big N auditors 
tended to promote unconditional conservatism, 
















The industry specialist non-Big N auditors were 
associated with better forecasting performance by 
analysts. 
2) Audit reporting 
accuracy 
 
Barbadillo et al. 
(2004) - 
Spanish firms; 





No significant association was found between the 
propensity to issue a going-concern (modified) 
audit opinion and industry specialist auditors.  





The auditors’ industry expertise significantly 
reduced earnings management among clients of 
Big N auditors. 
 
Van Caneghem 
(2004) – UK 
listed firms; 





The auditor industry specialization was not 






A strong negative association between industry 
specialist auditors and earnings management was 
found. 
Hours of 
audit work   
To test the effect of audit 





– Greek firms 
 
It was found a significant negative association 





To analyse the relation 
between AQ and IPO 
underpricing and audit 
fees. 
Albring et 
al. (2007) – 
listed firms 
  
The auditor reputation measure (AQ) was 
positively associated with lower IPO underpricing 
and higher auditor compensation. 
Note: Whenever there is no reference of the type of firms, it means authors used unlisted companies. 
As reported by DeFond and Zhang (2014), most studies in literature used auditor-specific characteristics 
during tests of client demand drivers for audit quality. Both U.S. and international studies capture the 
demand for high audit quality by referring to client’s choice of auditor-specific characteristics. However, 
while the U.S. studies mostly analyse factors guiding the client’s demand for audit quality related to agency 
costs, market reactions, investment opportunities, financing decisions and financial reporting quality, the 
international studies (including the cross-country studies) are typically located in demand drivers related to 
financial reporting quality.  
Two single country studies, one using data from U.S. listed firms (Chang et al., 2009) and the other 
using data from Taiwan listed firms (Tsai and Hua, 2009), consistently support the view that Big N auditors 
facilitate financing decisions of client companies. Also, two studies with data from Spain and Malaysia 
reveal that Big N auditors present higher audit reporting accuracy (Barbadillo et al., 2004; Johl et al., 2007). 
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Concerning the examination of the demand for high audit quality based on the client’s demand for positive 
market reactions, up to 2010, we found several single country studies, but just one from outside the U.S., 
the Hussainey (2009) study, with data from UK. These studies generally indicated that Big N and industry 
specialist auditors are associated with positive market reactions. This denotes the high importance that 
capital markets assume in the U.S. and UK when compared with other countries worldwide. Due to specific 
attributes of these countries, in the U.S. and UK the capital markets dominate the financial systems, in 
marked contrast to other countries such as France, Germany, and Japan, where banks are more important 
(Dudley and Hubbard, 2004). In the U.S., banking regulation and economies of scale have been important 
factors in the development of capital markets. The U.S. banking system has been much less concentrated 
than those of other countries, because for much of its history, the U.S. commercial banking system was 
regulated with the goal of preventing individual banks from achieving great economic power. Scale is 
relevant because the U.S. is a big economy with numerous large companies, and while securities issuance 
is characterized by relatively high setup costs, there are very low incremental costs as the size of a securities 
issue increases (Dudley and Hubbard, 2004). In the UK, the development of the capital market was spurred 
by London’s long history as a major financial center in the global economy (Dudley and Hubbard, 2004). 
 Further research is warranted on how capital markets react to incentives for high audit quality based 
on auditor-specific characteristics, namely with data from countries outside the U.S. and UK and from 
countries with emerging capital markets, including in the research models variables related to the 
institutional context. As highlighted by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA, 2012) 
there are unique challenges arising from the systems of control and governance in emerging markets.  
As we have said, when compared to U.S. studies, there is a particular incidence of international studies 
that used auditor-specific characteristics in testing the factors that drive the clients’ demand for audit quality 
related to financial reporting quality. U.S. studies, and single country studies using data from Australia, 
Asian countries, and France (Lee et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2005; Chia et al., 2007; Benkraiem, 2009) 
generally support the argument that, compared to non-Big N, Big N auditors promote the quality financial 
reporting of their clients. However, single country studies measuring audit quality through the auditors’ 
industry experience provide mixed evidence on the association between industry specialist auditors and 
earnings quality. Krishnan (2003b) used U.S. data and Rusmin (2010) data from Singaporean listed firms, 
and they confirmed that Big N industry specialist auditors significantly reduced earnings management 
among their clients, but two studies based on UK and Taiwan listed firms (Van Caneghem, 2004; Chen et 
al., 2005) do not provide such evidence.  
The mixed evidence reported may arise from the type of auditor industry specialization measures and/or 
the type of earnings quality measures that are used, as the results of these models are highly sensitive to 
these type of variables (Hay and Jeter, 2011; Audousset-Coulier et al., 2016). As reported by Audousset-
Coulier et al. (2016), measures of auditor industry specialization suffer from econometric and conceptual 
problems, failing to capture the complexity of the audit industry specialization concept properly (we will 
discuss the main limitations below in this section). Concerning the financial reporting quality measures, 
Dechow et al. (2010) argue that all proxies used by researchers are somehow affected by both a firm’s 
fundamental performance and its measurement and, accordingly, they do not measure the same underlying 
construct and they should not be expected to perform equally well under all circumstances. Earnings quality 
measures tend to have high measurement error and even bias (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). As reported in 
the previous section, additionally, most of these research models can suffer from omitted variables bias, 
from spurious correlation, or from endogenous auditor choice. We encourage future research using better 
specified models and the use of complementary measures of auditors’ industry specialization and earnings 
quality. We further recommend the use of specific techniques to address endogeneity econometric concerns.  
In terms of cross-country studies using auditor-specific characteristics in tests of the client’s demand 
drivers for audit quality, we found three studies that used demand drivers related to financial reporting 
quality and the audit firm’s brand name as a proxy for audit quality. While single country studies largely 
support the notion that Big N auditors tend to promote the quality financial reporting of their clients, the 
cross-country studies provide no evidence of an international Big N auditor effect on earnings quality of 
audit clients (Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006), and suggest that the strength of the countries’ legal and 
regulatory systems is the factor explaining the Big N auditor effect on audit quality (Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen, 2006; Francis and Wang, 2008; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008). 
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Cross-country studies have a major advantage over single country studies because they have the 
capacity to exploit the causal factors of international variations in audit quality related to audit firm brand 
name/size, but endogeneity concerns and differences in firm size and industry composition across countries 
are a significant challenge in this sort of research (Gordon et al., 2013; Simmnet et al., 2016).  
Two of the cross-country studies described in this section were designed to conduct firm-level analysis, 
and the third at the country-level (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2008). In terms of country-level factors 
that may cause variations in earnings quality, Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) controlled for the national 
audit regime and for the international capital markets; Francis and Wang (2008) used five variables to 
characterize a country’s investor protection regime, and Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) controlled 
for a country’s tax alignment, legal and litigation system. The simultaneous inclusion of fixed effects for 
industries and years, as a mean to control for potential variations in earnings quality across industries and 
over time, was only made by Francis and Wang (2008). With regard to the measurement of financial 
reporting quality,  Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) used a single measure of abnormal accruals, Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) used an aggregate measure of earnings management (computed at 
country-level), and Francis and Wang (2008) used three alternative proxies for earnings management. The 
three cross-country studies essentially controlled for institutional differences on audit quality related to a 
country’s legal and regulatory systems, and for differences in firm size and industry composition across 
countries. However, the research models used still suffer from endogeneity problems. 
We strongly recommend future research on determinants of international variations in audit quality 
related to auditors’ brand name or size, using cross-country studies, but with better specified research 
designs. In addition to the country’s legal and regulatory systems, a good research model will include 
variables that control for other country-institutional factors that may drive cross-country variations in 
financial reporting quality, such as country-level economic, political, cultural and religious factors, the 
country’s development of the audit profession and the development and the importance of equity markets 
(when possible, contextual factors could be measured at the region or city-level) (Michas, 2011; Gordon et 
al., 2013; Simmnet et al., 2016). As stated by Francis (2011a), the institutional setting in which audits are 
conducted creates incentives for both individuals and audit firms, and this should be taken into 
consideration in this type of research.4 Endogeneity concerns should be further controlled (Simmnet et al., 
2016). Additionally, as, especially in cross-country studies, earnings management models exhibit 
considerable variation in performance, caused by the international variation in model misspecification 
problems as well as sample size (Meuwissen et al., 2007), researchers should use alternative proxies for 
earnings quality. Emerging countries offer an excellent opportunity for future research in this area (Michas, 
2011; ACCA, 2012). 
Using auditor-specific characteristics to measure audit quality can be appellative to researchers because 
there are variables that can be constructed from public disclosures such as auditor size and client-based 
measures of auditor industry expertise. A major strength of the Big N proxy is its relatively high construct 
validity (Big N is associated with almost all other proxies for audit quality), and a strength of industry 
specialization is that it provides a measure of quality variation among Big N auditors, and this allows 
researchers to address questions related to within-Big-N quality differences (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). 
DeFond and Zhang (2014) further state that a distinguishing feature of these measures is that, at least over 
a reasonable horizon, Big N and industry specialization are fixed characteristics of the auditor (not 
engagement-specific), and this restricts auditors to use Big N membership, or industry specialization as 
choice variables in determining the level of audit quality they supply. Nevertheless, auditor size and 
industry expertise can be relatively noisy measures of audit quality.  
A major limitation of these proxies is that they are typically measured dichotomously, implicitly 
assuming a homogeneous level of audit quality within each group (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Furthermore, 
as Francis (2004) pointed out, findings revealing strong support that Big N auditors are more likely to 
promote the client’s earnings quality than non-Big N auditors, can be explained as “good” companies are 
more likely to select a Big N auditor and less likely to manage earnings. In other words, it is not high-
quality auditing that causes the observed audit outcomes, but rather that auditor choice is endogenous, and 
it may be the case that good firms with good earnings quality hire high-quality auditors (Francis, 2004).5  
Regarding auditors’ industry expertise, a major concern is related to its measurement. Audousset-
Coulier et al. (2016) argue that auditor industry specialization measures fail to capture the complexity of 
the audit industry specialization concept properly. Given that an audit firm’s level of industry specialization 
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is not observable, researchers must use indirect proxies of this concept to test it empirically, and the two 
main categories of methods used are the market-share based and the client portfolio-based approaches 
(Audousset-Coulier et al., 2016). A variety of surrogates have been used to measure auditor market and 
portfolio shares: the proportion of audit fees (Rusmin, 2010); the proportion of industry sales audited 
(Krishnan, 2003b; Barbadillo et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2005); the proportion of clients in a particular 
industry to the total clients of the auditor (Van Caneghem, 2004); the proportion of the clients’ total assets 
in a particular industry to the total assets of all the clients of the auditor (Behn et al., 2008). This diversity 
of proxies, as well as the various criteria adopted to classify auditors as industry specialists, render the 
empirical results difficult to compare and interpret (Audousset-Coulier et al., 2016). Several issues could 
limit the validity of the auditor’s market share as a proxy for its industry specialization. For instance, just 
because an auditor reaches a certain level of audit fees or audits the bigger companies in a given industry, 
this does not mean that the auditor is an industry specialist. Likewise, the market share tends to classify the 
Big N auditors as industry leaders, and this may make it difficult to disentangle the effects of industry 
specialization from an auditor’s size (Behn et al., 2008). Additionally, Minutti-Meza (2013) suggests that 
earlier observed industry specialization benefits are explained by self-selection, in particular, that these 
observed benefits may be due to client characteristics.  
As stated by Simmnet et al. (2016), the area of input-based measures of audit quality needs further 
research on audit effort, because it has the ability to provide evidence-based results as to, for example, how 
different auditors approach the audit for clients with different risk profiles, or, what is the role of the 
engagement partner, the review partner, or the senior manager, who are all key players in the audit process. 
The audit team composition, which is generally considered to be exogenous, including assigning tasks 
within the team, and characteristics of high-performing teams, are areas that would benefit from future 
research (Simmnet et al. (2016). 
In summary, as Knechel et al. (2013) argue, the resources needed for an audit depend on the personnel 
available for an engagement, the abilities and expertise of the audit team, and the audit technology and 
methodology being used. Furthermore, the idiosyncratic nature of the audit process implies that an auditor’s 
effort level needs to be tailored to each client within the structure of the basic audit methodology, as applied 
by the auditor, using his/her best judgment. Thus, it is important to realize that inputs of audit quality cannot 
be defined in strictly quantitative terms, as would be the case in a process that produces a large volume of 
nearly identical tangible products. It is also important to understand the nature of incentives and cognition 
in the audit process and how they relate to the inherent uncertainty and idiosyncrasies of the audit 
engagement (Knechel et al., 2013). Francis (2011a) further highlights the importance of control for 
incentives to individuals and audit firms arising from the institutional setting in which audits are conducted. 
 
3.2. Output-Based Measures of Audit Quality  
 
Since the purpose of an audit is to provide assurance on financial statements, audit quality is defined as 
the probability that financial statements contain no material misstatements (Titman and Trueman, 1986; 
Palmrose, 1988; Lee et al., 1999). Under this approach, the literature has traditionally viewed the presence 
of higher audit quality in terms of lacking certain negative outcomes or having certain positive outcomes 
(Knechel et al., 2013).  
In this section we evaluate the most commonly used output-based measures of audit quality. The main 
proxies used by prior studies to capture audit outcomes are the auditors’ litigation activities, PCAOB 
inspections, accounting restatements, audit reports, the quality of financial reporting, and perception-based 
measures.  
 
Auditors’ litigation activities 
 
Several authors have used auditors’ litigation activities as a measure of audit failures, and therefore as 
a measure of audit quality. These studies assume that the existence of a legal action against an auditor 
indicates a higher likelihood of an audit failure. Table 3 provides a synthesis of studies that used legal 




Table 3. Output–based measures of audit quality (AQ) - Legal actions (or claims) against auditors 
AQ Measure  Purpose U.S. Studies 
International Studies 





























Stice (1991)   
The client’ asset structure, financial condition, market value, and the 
variability of its returns influenced the chance of litigation against the 
auditor. 
Lys and Watts 
(1994) 
  
Overall, lawsuits were associated with both misleading financial 





Issuance of a modified audit reports on the firm’s last pre-bankruptcy 









The probability of auditor litigation increases as clients report more 
positive (income-increasing) abnormal accruals, i.e., auditor 
conservatism was negative associated with audit litigation.  
Casterella et al. 
(2009) 
  
Peer-review findings (from AICPA) were useful in predicting audit 
failures and audit ligation. They signaled specific indicators of 
potentially weak quality control or risky practices within audit firms that 
may explain audit failures and litigation. 
 
According to Francis (2011a), the legal system of a country has an important role in defining an audit 
failure, the parties that can take legal action against auditors when there is an alleged failure, the standard 
of proof for determining if a failure occurs, and the legal remedy against auditors if there is failure. 
Reflecting this situation, auditors generally face more exposure to litigation in common law countries such 
as U.S. and Australia where courts are used to settle disputes, and, in contrast, auditors generally face less 
direct legal exposure in code law countries such as Continental Europe, because disputes in these countries 
are more likely to be handled administratively by the audit public oversight bodies (Francis, 2011a). Table 
3 denotes this reality, and only presents studies based on U.S. data. Prior research revealed that there are 
significant differences in litigation rates across the Big N auditors, but also that the Big N auditors have 
lower litigation rates than non-Big N auditors (Palmrose, 1988; Fuerman and Kraten, 2009). In relation to 
the factors that lead to litigation actions against auditors, they are essentially related to the client firm’s 
financial condition and potentially weak quality control or risky practices within audit firms (Stice, 1991; 
Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; Lys and Watts, 1994; Casterella et al., 2009). Auditor conservatism seems to 
be negatively related to audit litigation (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Heninger, 2001; Cahan and 
Zhang, 2006).  
As reported by Knechel et al. (2013), the majority of lawsuits against auditors are settled out of court 
and the settlement amounts are often confidential. Francis (2011a) further states that the number of legal 
actions against auditors worldwide is small and that legal actions may tell nothing about audit quality 
because audit quality is conceptualized as a continuum, from very low to very high quality, and audit 
failures more commonly occur at the extreme low end of quality. Legal actions against auditors only focus 
on extreme situations which are not representative of a more holistic state of audit quality, and, thereby, 
using auditors’ litigation activities as a measure of audit quality is somewhat limited (Knechel et al., 2013). 
Using lawsuits against auditors as a proxy for audit quality is more suitable in studies from common law 





Knechel et al. (2013) highlight that one of the most direct outcomes of audit quality are the results of 
regulatory reviews of audit firms.  
Many countries worldwide have established public oversight systems of auditors. In the U.S., regulatory 
views of audit firms include self-regulation through peer reviews for auditors of private firms and 
independent inspection by the PCAOB for auditors of public companies (Knechel et al., 2013). In the 
European Union (EU), the Directive 2006/43/EC, of May 17, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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(EU, 2006) required Member States to organize, by 2008, an effective system of public oversight for 
statutory auditors and audit firms on the basis of home country control. Canada, Australia, Brazil, New 
Zealand, Ireland, The Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Russia, Japan, China, Turkey, and many other 
countries worldwide also have independent audit oversight authorities. The International Forum of 
Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) brings together independent audit regulators from a total of 52 
jurisdictions.6  
Compared with other national audit oversight bodies, PCAOB has a much larger scope, since it inspects 
both U.S. and non-U.S. registered auditing firms. Created in 2002 by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), the 
PCAOB has, today, over 2,000 auditing firms registered, of which 57% are firms located in the U.S. and 
43% are located outside the U.S. The non-U.S. registrants come from 86 different jurisdictions around the 
world. The PCAOB mission is to oversee the audits of public companies in order to protect the interests of 
investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit 
reports.7 Thus, the PCAOB inspections results of U.S. and non-U.S. registered auditing firms may be 
valuable for signaling audit quality (DeFond, 2010; Gunny and Zhang, 2013). Table 4 provides an overview 
of studies that used the results of PCAOB inspections to signal audit quality. 
 
Table 4. Output–based measures of audit quality (AQ) - PCAOB Inspections 




















Landis et al. 
(2011) 
  
The average number of auditing deficiencies per PCAOB inspection has 
significantly decreased over time, suggesting that audit quality has 
improved as a result of PCAOB inspection process. 













No association was found between PCAOB inspection results and 
subsequent changes in client’s audit firm choices.  
Abbott et al. 
(2008);  
  
Audit firms with PCAOB inspection deficiencies were more likely to be 




Audit firms with PCAOB inspection deficiencies were more likely to be 
dismissed by their clients and were more likely to voluntarily make a 











Small audit firms were increasingly likely to exit the market since the 




Audit firms with PCAOB inspection deficiencies were more likely to 






PCAOB inspections led to an increase in the number of going concern 




Carcello et al. 
(2011) 
  
It was found a positive association between PCAOB inspection results to 
B4 audit firms (domiciled in U.S.) and earnings quality of their clients 
(significant reduction of abnormal accruals). 
5) Stock market 
reaction 
Dee et al. 
(2011) 
  
It was found a significant negative stock market reaction for clients of a B4 





It were found abnormal market reactions following PCAOB inspections 
that reveal audit deficiencies. 
Although our literature review focuses on studies published between 1980 and 2010, in the particular 
case of studies that used the results of PCAOB inspections to signal audit quality, the literature is scarce. 
As such, in Table 4 we include several studies whose publication date is 2011 but for which the preliminary 
versions were made available up to 2010.  
Three studies reported a tendency for significant reduction in the number of auditing deficiencies 
identified since the first years of the PCAOB inspections (Hermanson et al., 2007; Church and Shefchik, 
2010; Landis et al., 2011), suggesting improvements in audit quality. Nevertheless, Knechel et al. (2013) 
argue that this downward linear trend in the number of deficiencies in PCAOB inspection reports may 
simple suggest that audit firms are better at managing the inspection process, rather than suggesting 
enhancements in audit quality.  
The results of Gramling et al. (2011) and Carcello et al. (2011) further indicated that the PCAOB 
inspections promote the quality of audit reporting and the financial reporting quality of audit clients. These 
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two studies were performed at the audit client level and the authors controlled for several client 
characteristics (size, leverage, size, financial performance) and for auditors’ behaviour concerning audit 
prices and audit reporting.  
Other studies analysed the association between PCAOB inspection results and auditor dismissals. While 
Lennox and Pittman (2010) found no association between the PCAOB inspection results and subsequent 
changes in clients’ audit firm choices, Abbott et al. (2008) and Dougherty et al. (2011) provided evidence 
that audit firms with PCAOB inspection deficiencies are more likely to be dismissed by their clients. The 
inconsistencies between these results may be derived from the research designs that were used. Lennox and 
Pittman (2010) and Dougherty et al. (2011) estimated their models at the audit firm level. Rather, Abbott 
et al. (2008) estimated their model at the client level and controlled for several client characteristics 
(corporate governance mechanisms, leverage, size, and financial performance) and for auditors’ behaviour 
concerning audit prices and audit reporting. Lennox and Pittman (2010) highlight that estimating these 
models at the level of the audit firm leads to parsimonious specifications since client characteristics do not 
come into play. DeFond and Lennox (2011) and Dougherty et al. (2011) provided further evidence 
revealing that small audit firms were increasingly likely to exit the market since the inception of the PCAOB 
inspections and that audit firms with PCAOB inspection deficiencies were more likely to resign from the 
PCAOB. Other studies analysed stock price reactions to publication of the PCAOB inspection reports, 
revealing negative market reactions following PCAOB inspections that revealed audit deficiencies (Dee et 
al., 2011; Offermanns and Peek, 2011).  
In summary, while some research suggests that PCAOB inspections stimulate improvements in audit 
quality and have been beneficial to the audit profession, several studies support the position that the PCAOB 
inspection process has been penalizing for audit firms. A major concern in this type of research is that these 
studies used different research designs, different levels of analysis and almost only apply to smaller U.S. 
audit firms that are inspected triennially (DeFond and Zhang, 2014).  
The studies published up to 2010/2011 examined the effects of PCAOB inspections on auditing, 
reporting quality and the overall audit market, but research was centered on the effects of PCAOB’s 
inspection program in the U.S., leaving out the effects of PCAOB’s international inspection program. The 
PCAOB is required by SOX to inspect audit firms even if the auditor is not domiciled in the U.S, but only 
a few recent studies have explored the effectiveness of the PCAOB’s inspection of non-U.S. auditors.8 
Given the importance of the PCAOB international inspections, and the efforts and resources that PCAOB 
has devoted to international inspections, research is needed to examine whether and how the PCAOB 
international inspections influence the audit market and inspected auditors (Song and Ye, 2014). 
Notwithstanding the fact that many countries around the world have established public oversight systems 
of auditors, access to data on the findings from inspections of audit firms and individual audit engagements 
reports is a major problem for researchers (the IFIAR only makes available to the public the aggregate 
findings of inspections, and it is also the national level of reporting that is available in the majority of 
countries worldwide). In the U.S., PCAOB conducts inspections of both U.S. and non-U.S. registered audit 
firms and, upon completion of each inspection, it prepares a written report on the inspection and 
subsequently makes portions of those reports available to the public on PCAOB’s website. Therefore, 
PCAOB inspections of U.S. and non-U.S. audit firms seem to be the most relevant context to explore the 
inspection results of public oversight systems of auditors as a proxy for audit quality.  
Knechel et al. (2013) claim that there are several empirical challenges to be resolved in research around 
the effectiveness of the PCAOB inspection process: on the one hand, the auditing deficiencies are publicly 
disclosed in the inspection reports without identifying the client affected, i.e., the inspection reports do not 
identify the issuers inspected; on the other hand, PCAOB uses a risk-based approach to selecting issuer 
engagements for review, implying that the sample of issuers is not representative of the population. 
Furthermore, empirical findings from analysing PCAOB inspection reports and changes in the overall audit 
market may be confounded with other changes in the audit market during the same period (Knechel et al., 
2013). Also, many argue that PCAOB inspection results are not valuable for signaling audit quality because 
the reports do not include an overall evaluative assessment and the quality control deficiencies are often 
not disclosed (DeFond 2010; Lennox and Pittman 2010). DeFond (2010) further indicated that PCAOB 
inspections have also been criticized because inspectors lack current auditing expertise.  
Whether PCAOB inspections improve audit quality remains unclear (Abernathy et al., 2013; DeFond 
and Zhang, 2014), but there is some potential for improvement due to the potential regulation, litigation, 
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and reputation costs associated with noncompliance (DeFond, 2010). Abernathy et al. (2013) highlight that 
these costs can extend to the marketplace, where investors may penalize firms whose auditors have been 
singled out by PCAOB. 
 
Accounting Restatements  
 
As reported by Knechel et al. (2013), a common indicator used to proxy for negative audit quality is 
the presence of an accounting restatement. Regarding the accounting restatements, prior literature 
distinguishes between irregularities and errors, and irregularities tend to be considered more egregious 
restatements, which are much more likely to be intentional, i.e., fraudulent (Knechel et al., 2013). Palmrose 
et al. (2004) argue that the perceived need to reduce the number of restatements helped motivate the 
formation of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness in the U.S.. The Panel stated that ‘‘restatements of previously 
audited financial statements raise questions about whether the system that provides assurances about both 
the quality of audits and the reliability of financial reports is operating effectively’’ (Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness, 2000, Chapter 3, paragraph 26). Table 5 provides a synthesis of studies that used accounting 
restatements as a proxy for audit quality. 
 
Table 5. Output–based measures of audit quality (AQ) - Accounting Restatements 
AQ Measure  Purpose U.S. Studies 
International Studies 
Main Findings 
Single country Cross-country 
Accounting 
Restatements 
To analyse the relation 
between AQ and: 
 
 




Romanus et al. 
(2008) – listed firms 
 
Chin and Chi 
(2009) - Taiwan 
listed firms; 
Li and Chen 
(2010) - Taiwan 
listed firms  
 
 
Presence of restatements was negatively 
associated to auditor’s industry expertise, and 




tenure and auditor 
changes  
Stanley and DeZoort 
(2007) - listed firms; 
Liu et al., (2009) - 
listed firms 
  
Occurrence of restatements was negatively 
associated to longer periods of auditor tenure 






Ofobike (2008);  
Thompson and 
McCoy (2008) - 
Fortune 500 Firms; 
Agrawal and Cooper 
(2009) - listed firms  
  
Auditor change (turnover) was significantly 
higher for restating firms than for non-
restating firms. 
3) Provision of non-
audit services 
 
Kinney et al. (2004) 
– listed firms  
  
Provision of non-audit services (tax services) 
was significantly negatively related to the 
occurrence of restatements. 
4) Audit fees 
 
Stanley and DeZoort 
(2007) - listed firms; 
  
For short tenure engagements, audit fees were 
negatively related to the likelihood of 
restatements. 
Hribar et al. (2010) -  
listed firms   
Abnormal audit fees were positively 
associated with subsequent restatements. 
Note: Whenever there is no reference of the type of firms, it means authors used unlisted companies. 
Eilifsen and Messier (2000) argue that accounting restatements provide an interesting and relevant 
domain to examine the drivers of audit quality, as one of the primary antecedents of accounting restatements 
is a failure by the external auditor to detect a misstatement prior to the issuance of the financial statements.  
Research analysing accounting restatements as an outcome of audit quality comes essentially from the 
U.S. (Table 5 denotes this reality: up to 2010, from outside the U.S., we only found two studies from 
Taiwan). Nevertheless, the number of restatements in the U.S. has declined significantly since its peak in 
2006 (Badertscher and Burks, 2011; Scholz, 2014). For Badertscher and Burks (2011), the decline may be 
due to corporations solving their internal control inadequacies, and corporations adapting to the changes 
imposed by Sarbanes Oxley Act.  
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Studies from U.S. and Taiwan consistently report that the occurrence of restatements is negatively 
associated with auditor industry expertise (Romanus et al., 2008; Chin and Chi, 2009), and aggregate audit 
team experience (Li and Chen, 2011). U.S. studies also revealed that the event of restatements is negatively 
associated with the ratifications of auditor selection by shareholders (Liu et al., 2009) and auditor tenure 
(Stanley and DeZoort, 2007), and positively related with auditor turnover (Williams, 1988; Srinivasan, 
2005; Wallace, 2005; Calderon and Ofobike, 2008; Thompson and McCoy, 2008; Agrawal and Cooper, 
2009). A major concern in this type of research design is that it does not focus solely on restatements, nor 
distinguish between turnover resulting from auditor resignations and from dismissals by clients. As such, 
one cannot infer whether the switches were prompted by auditor resignations in response to an increase in 
client risk, or by client dismissals in response to poor auditor performance (Hennes et al., 2014).  
Other studies investigated whether audit fees and non-audit fees are associated with restatements. 
Kinney et al. (2004) indicated that the provision of non-audit services significantly reduces the likelihood 
of restatements and Stanley and DeZoort (2007) reported a negative association between audit fees and 
subsequent restatements. However, Hribar et al. (2010) found evidence that abnormal audit fees are 
positively associated with subsequent restatements.  
Notwithstanding the theoretically negative relation between audit effort and accounting restatements, 
some studies fail to find the predicted relation. Lobo and Zhao (2013) identify two research design issues 
that could explain the inconsistency: 1) failure to control for misstatement risk leads to an upward bias in 
the estimated relation between audit effort and the likelihood of restatements, reflecting a serious correlated 
omitted variable problem (because audit effort is endogenous); 2) the predicted negative relation between 
audit effort and subsequent restatements is applicable only to audited financial reports, and commingling 
restatements of audited with unaudited reports introduces an additional upward bias in the association 
between audit effort and restatements. Hennes et al. (2008) further claim that the research on the causes 
and consequences of restatements can be significantly improved by distinguishing errors from irregularities, 
i.e., controlling for the type of restatement (error versus irregularity) is likely to improve the power of tests 
in restatement settings.  
Plumlee and Yohn (2010) state that empirical evidence on the underlying causes of restatements has 
been lacking, and Coffee (2005) reports that accounting restatements are rare in Europe, and that sources 
of information on restatements outside the U.S. are also scarce (Taiwan is an exception). In the U.S., public 
companies are required by regulation (Section 4.02 of Securities and Exchange Commission) to disclose of 
the error(s) in a report (Form 8-K), and they are available two databases of restatement announcements (the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Audit Analytics databases).9 The Audit Analytics 
database includes data on restatements of approximately 20,000 SEC registrants, including foreign and 
Canadian filers. Therefore, in our view, SEC registrants (U.S. and non-U.S. firms) seem to be the most 
suitable context to use accounting restatements as an outcome of audit quality.10 
We suggest future research on the drivers of audit quality, using restatements as an outcome of audit 
quality, based on U.S. and non-U.S. data, but with better specified research designs and more reliable 
variables. In particular, the type of restatement (error versus irregularity) should be controlled for and 
samples restricted to restatements of audited reports. In cross-country studies, research models should 
include variables that control for several country-institutional factors that may drive cross-country 
variations in accounting restatements.11 Furthermore, endogeneity concerns ought to be controlled for. 
Knechel et al. (2013) argue that restatements focus only on extreme events which could be rare and may 
not represent a holistic state of audit quality. But for DeFond and Francis (2005) and Hennes et al. (2014), 
restatements can provide a salient signal of poor audit quality and more direct evidence that the auditor 
failed to either detect or report an accounting treatment that is inconsistent with GAAP.  
 
Audit reporting  
 
Currently, the audit opinion is the auditor’s only direct channel of communication with stakeholders 
about the audit process and its outcome, and the accuracy of audit reports is often viewed as a signal of 
audit quality (Knechel et al., 2013; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Table 6 outlines prior studies that used the 




Table 6. Output–based measures of audit quality (AQ) – Audit reports 
AQ 
Measure  
Purpose U.S. Studies 
International Studies 






To explore factors that 
determine auditor’s 
propensity to issue a 
modified/going concern 



















Long-term auditor client relationships significantly 
reduced the auditors’ willingness to qualify audit reports. 




The propensity to issue a going concern audit opinions 
for distressed firms/bankrupt firms was not associated 













Shafie et al. 
(2009) – 
Malaysia 




al. (2004) - 
Spanish firms 
 
The auditors’ decision to issue a going concern opinion 








It was found evidence of a lower propensity to issue a 
going-concern audit opinion for long periods of audit 
partner tenure.  
 





Propensity to issue a going-concern opinion increased 
with audit firm tenure.  
 
Barbadillo et 




Abolishment of mandatory audit rotation incremented 
the auditors’ probability to issue going-concern audit 
opinions to distressed firms. 





In a sample of distressed firms, larger clients in offices 
of Big N auditors were more likely to receive going 






Auditors were significantly less likely to issue a going-
concern opinion to clients that paid higher audit fees and 
when the audit firm had lost a relatively high proportion 
of its clients.  
 




Up to an institutional setting change, the propensity to 
issue modified audit opinions was negatively correlated 
to client importance. When the institutional environment 
became more investor-friendly, the propensity to issue 
modified audit opinions was positively related to client 
importance. 





It was found a significant positive relation between the 
level of tax services fees and the likelihood of issuing a 
going-concern audit opinion, prior bankruptcies. 
4) Prior affiliation 
of executive 
officers with audit 
firms 
Lennox (2005)   
Affiliated clients were significantly more likely to 
receive clean audit opinions than unaffiliated clients. 
5) Auditors’  
industry 
experience 
Lim and Tang 
(2008) 
  
Propensity to issue going-concern audit opinions to 
financially distressed firms increased with the level of 
non-audit services acquired from industry specialist 




Propensity to issue going-concern audit opinions to 
financially distressed firms increased as Big N auditors 
were both national and city-specific industry specialists, 
as opposed to Big N non-specialist auditors. 
Note: Whenever there is no reference of the type of firms, it means authors used unlisted companies.    
                                        (Continued) 
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Table 6. Output–based measures of audit quality (AQ) – Audit reports - Continued 
AQ 
Measure  
Purpose U.S. Studies 
International Studies 






To explore factors that 
determine auditor’s 
propensity to issue a 
modified/going concern 




(1999) – UK 
listed firms 
 
Compared to small auditors, Big N auditors were 
significantly more likely to issue qualified audit reports to 






Association between the propensity to issue going concern 
audit opinions for distressed firms and auditor size (Big N/ 
non-Big N auditors) was not significant. 
Francis and 
Krishnan 
(2002) – U.S. 
listed firms  
  
Under litigation reforms, both Big N and non-Big N auditors 
reported less conservatively. 
 
 
6) Auditor size 
Geiger et al. 




– U.S. listed 
firms 
  
Under litigation reforms, the propensity of Big N auditors 





Larger offices of Big N auditors were more likely to issue 
going-concern audit opinions (even to financially distressed 
firms), as opposed to small offices of Big N auditors.  
Boone et al. 
(2010) 
  
Big N auditors had a higher propensity to issue going 
concern audit opinions for distressed firms, when compared 
to non-Big N auditors. 
To explore whether 
there are differences in 
auditor reporting 
behaviour between 
countries, across legal 









listed firms  
Firms in code law countries were significantly more likely 
to receive going concern audit opinions than to those in 
common law countries.  
Global audit firm networks provided a more consistent 
approach to the application of going concern audit reporting 
standards.  
The country differences between auditors were much less 
pronounced if the clients’ level of financial distress was 
either extremely high or very low. 
Note: Whenever there is no reference of the type of firms, it means authors used unlisted companies. 
According to DeFond and Zhang (2014), the accuracy of audit reports has been used to capture audit 
quality in a diversity of settings, with a particular emphasis on tests of perceived threats to audit quality, 
such as those potentially posed by auditors’ tenure, client economic importance, and the provision of non-
audit services. The correctness of audit reports is also used to test whether audit quality is related to auditor 
size and industry expertise. 
Our synthesis reveals that the effect of auditor tenure on the accuracy of audit reports was mainly 
analysed by international single country studies (up to 2010, we only found one study using U.S. data). 
Evidence provided by those studies is mixed. While studies that used data from Belgian and Australian 
firms reported that long-term auditor client relationships significantly reduce the auditors’ willingness to 
qualify audit reports (Vanstraelen, 2000; Carey and Simnett, 2006), studies from U.S., Belgian, Spain, 
Australia, and Malaysia found evidence that the propensity to issue a going concern audit opinion (namely 
for distressed firms) does not depend on the auditors’ tenure (Geiger  and Raghunandan, 2002; Vanstraelen, 
2002; Barbadillo et al., 2004; Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2007; Jackson et al., 2008; Shafie et al., 2009), and 
that the abolishment of mandatory audit rotation even increased the likelihood of auditors issuing going-
concern audit opinions to distressed firms (Barbadillo et al., 2009). The level of analysis (audit firm-level 
versus engagement partner level) and the control variables included in the research models may explain the 
inconsistency between the results. Carey and Simnett (2006) conducted their analysis at the audit-partner 
level, but all the other studies used the audit-firm level. Regarding the control variables, generally, all 
studies included a set of client firm characteristics related with age, size, leverage and several controls for 
financial performance, but only a few studies included corporate governance controls (Geiger and 
Raghunandan, 2002; Shafie et al., 2009) and industry controls (Carey and Simnett, 2006; Jackson et al., 
2008; Barbadillo et al., 2009). All studies controlled for audit firm size and audit pricing, but only three 
studies controlled for auditor industry specialization (Barbadillo et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 2008; 
Barbadillo et al., 2009). A key point in these research-type models is endogeneity bias related with auditors’ 
tenure and auditor selection, but none of the studies analysed had focused in this important issue.  
 The benefits of long periods of auditor tenure on audit reporting seem to overcome those of auditors’ 
rotation. Yet, this is an area where more research is need. The research designs should control for 
endogeneity bias by using specific econometric methods, and should include controls for firms’ corporate 
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governance mechanisms, because this is an issue of great importance with regard to audit reporting 
behaviour (Carcello and Neal, 2000; Barbadillo et al., 2004; Shafie et al., 2009). Furthermore, there is a 
lack of research involving cross-country studies (that should control for country’s institutional features), 
and studies that analyse the effects of auditor tenure at the audit partner-level and audit firm-level (Lennox 
et al., 2014). As Lennox et al. (2014) describe, many jurisdictions (such as U.S., Argentina, Australia, 
China, Hong Kong, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, The Netherlands, Russia, Taiwan, and EU Member 
States up to June 2016) impose limitations on the length of audit partner tenure, but they impose no 
limitations on the length of audit firm tenure.12 Despite the widespread prevalence of this practice, there is 
very little evidence on the consequences of mandatory partner rotation when audit firms do not have to be 
rotated (Lennox et al., 2014). In that case, the audit methodology, procedures, and other engagement 
personnel do not certainly change, and so, it is an open question as to whether mandatory partner rotation 
can really improve audit quality (Lennox et al., 2014). A limitation of this type of research is that most 
countries do not require partners’ names to be disclosed in audit reports and so researchers are unable to 
identify the partner rotation. This may be a reason for the low number of studies examining this matter in 
the U.S. context (Lennox et al., 2014).  
The persistence of international studies (compared to U.S. studies) analysing the relation between audit 
reporting accuracy and threats related with auditor tenure can also be explained by the differences in legal 
and regulatory settings worldwide, and thus, it may be that regulatory changes drive this type of research. 
While in the U.S., mandatory partner rotation was implemented back in 1978 and by 2002, SOX imposed 
a five-year rotation of the audit engagement partner and had already considered the issue of mandatory 
audit firm rotation, Europe was reluctant to make changes in the regulation of auditor rotation (mandatory 
partner rotation was imposed by the Directive 2006/43/EC (EU, 2006) and Member States had to comply 
with the Directive up to 2008), and Australia introduced in 2004 a five year period of mandatory rotation 
of the audit engagement partner of listed firms, but no mandatory audit firm rotation (see, Cameran et al. 
(2015) for a recent review). In the timeline of our literature review (1980-2010), and as reported by Cameran 
et al. (2015), mandatory audit firm rotation was only in force for Brazilian, Italian and South Korean listed 
firms (Canada had in force mandatory audit firm rotation between 1923-1991 and Spain between 1988-
1995). In the EU, audit firm rotation for public interest companies became mandatory after June 2016 (EU, 
2014) and in the U.S., in 2014, PCAOB abandoned its project for mandatory audit firm rotation.  
Up to 2010 we found four studies that analysed the threats to audit reporting imposed by auditor 
economic dependence from a client and the provision of non-audit services, but the evidence provided by 
these studies is not consensual. Whilst Reinolds and Francis (2001) used U.S. data confirming that audit 
reporting is more conservative for larger clients of Big N auditors offices (in a sample of distressed firms), 
Vanstraelen (2002) and Chen et al. (2010), while using data from Belgian and Chinese firms, found that 
the propensity to issue a modified audit opinion is negatively correlated with client importance. Chen et al. 
(2010) revealed, however, that when the institutional environment become more investor-friendly, client 
economic importance was no longer a threat to audit reporting quality, perhaps due to the imposition of 
greater regulatory sanctions. Robinson (2008) further indicated that, prior to the bankruptcies of U.S. firms, 
auditor-provided tax services acted as a spillover of audit reporting quality. While these studies used similar 
research designs, Chen et al. (2010) calls attention to the importance of regulatory environments in this 
type of research. Carcello and Neal (2000) further highlight the importance of firms’ corporate governance 
mechanisms on audit reporting behaviour, but none of the studies controlled for this issue. Additionally, a 
subject that could lead to different findings is the level of analysis that is used when computing variables 
related with audit and non-audit fees, i.e., the audit firm-level, audit office-level, or engagement partner-
level. Future research should account for these issues and should be expanded to cross-country studies (that 
control for country-level characteristics).        
Prior studies also analysed whether the accuracy of the audit reports depends on supply drivers of audit 
quality, namely those related with auditors’ industry expertise and size. Evidence collected from U.S. 
studies indicate that the propensity to issue a going concern audit opinion to financially distressed firms 
increased with the level of non-audit services acquired from industry specialist auditors (Lim and Tang, 
2008), and when Big N auditors were both national and city-specific industry specialists (Reichelt and 
Wang, 2010). Studies based on UK and U.S. data further indicate that Big N auditors (and their larger 
offices) presented a higher propensity to issue a going concern audit opinion for distressed firms, when 
compared to non-Big N auditors (Lennox, 1999; Francis and Yu, 2009; Boone et al., 2010). However, 
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Vanstraelen (2002), using data from Belgian firms, found no association between the propensity to issue a 
going concern audit opinion for distressed firms and auditor size (Big N/non-Big N auditors), and Francis 
and Krishnan (2002), Geiger et al. (2006), and Geiger and Rama (2006) highlighted that, in the U.S., under 
litigation reforms, Big N and non-Big N auditors reported less conservatively.  
While the auditors’ brand name effect on audit reporting, per se, is not consistently relevant across the 
studies, industry specialization seems to act as a spillover of audit reporting quality. However, this type of 
research models are highly sensitive to the type of auditors’ industry specialization variables that are used 
and the level at which they are computed (Audousset-Coulier et al., 2016). DeFond and Zhang (2014) 
further argue that research examining the supply drivers of audit quality associated with auditors’ industry 
expertise can be constrained by a limitation inherent in the assumption that industry-specific knowledge is 
transferrable across clients, personnel and over time. Concerning the effects of auditors’ size on audit 
reporting, the evidence obtained by prior studies is not consensual. While in some cases auditor brand name 
appears to be a driver of audit reporting quality, several authors stressed the importance of litigation reforms 
in this type of research (Geiger et al., 2006; Geiger and Rama, 2006). Research models exploring the effects 
of supply drivers of audit quality associated with auditors industry and auditor size may suffer from omitted 
variables bias, from spurious correlation, or from endogenous auditor choice (Boone et al., 2010). Thus, 
additional research in this area that controls for these issues is recommended.  
The only cross-country study that we found up to 2010 (Carson et al., 2010) explored whether, holding 
the financial characteristics of the firms constant, there were differences in auditor reporting behaviour 
between countries, across legal frameworks, types of audit firms and whether these differences had changed 
over time. Carson et al. (2010) explored data from three common law countries (U.S., UK and Australia) 
and two code law countries (France and Germany). They found evidence that firms in code law countries 
were significantly more likely to receive going concern audit opinions relative to those in common law 
countries. Also, that global audit firm networks provided a more consistent approach to the application of 
going concern audit reporting standards and, the country differences between auditors were much less 
pronounced if the clients’ level of financial distress was either extremely high or very low. In their model, 
Carson et al. (2010) controlled for the audit firm type and for several firms’ characteristics (such as 
propensity to bankruptcy, size, leverage, financial performance, and return on assets), for the country’s 
litigation risk, and included dummy variables for years and countries. However, the model may still suffer 
from omitted variables bias, from spurious correlation, or from endogenous auditor choice. This is a very 
interesting field of work for future research. In addition to the already incorporated variables by Carson et 
al. (2010), future studies should additionally control for auditors tenure, audit fees and non-audit fees, firms’ 
corporate governance mechanisms, and country-level legal, economic, cultural, and religious 
characteristics. We further recommend using specific techniques to address endogeneity econometric 
concerns. Further research is warranted on how changes in the market for audit services impact on audit 
reporting decisions among differentially sized audit firms and different countries (Kaplan and Williams, 
2012).  
Analysing audit reports can represent an effective method to capture audit failures. DeFond and Zhang 
(2014) argue that modified audit opinions are discrete measures, with relatively high consensus on their 
measurement, relatively low measurement error, and are very direct measures of audit quality. The qualified 
audit opinion formulation process is a setting that allows direct insights into auditor independence and 
quality, because the audit opinion is the auditor's responsibility and is directly under his or her influence 
and control, and a failure in reporting a modified audit opinion when it is necessary is an egregious audit 
failure and evidence of poor audit quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014).  
Beyond the advantages of using the accuracy of audit reports when measuring audit quality, several 
limitations have been also appointed. Qualified audit opinions are relatively rare, related only to a few 
extreme situations, and cannot differentiate audit quality for a broad cross-section of firms (Myers et al., 
2003; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Several authors also state that the effectiveness of the auditor’s report, as 
an indicator of audit quality, is limited due to the restricted content of the report, that is, the inputs of the 
auditor’s reporting decision, such as information on materiality, independence, and significant audit risks, 
are not disclosed (Church et al., 2008; Mock et al., 2013). DeFond and Zhang (2014) further highlight that 
qualified audit opinions do not fully capture the broad value of an audit, and while the literature interprets 
more qualified audit opinions as greater auditor independence, this can also indicate excessive auditor 
conservatism, which arguably reduces audit quality. Thinking of audit quality as a continuous construct, 
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appears to be inconsistent with the binary nature of the audit opinion, because the audit opinion 
communicates the auditor’s assurance that the financial statements comply with GAAP, and audit quality 
refers to the quality of the auditor’s opinion (i.e., assurance), not the opinion itself (DeFond and Zhang, 
2014). Thus, an interesting context to explore the audit reports as a proxy for audit quality could involve 
using a field work approach to examine the audit report formulating process. 
 
Financial reporting quality 
 
Recognizing the importance of auditing in the financial reporting process, Antle and Nalebuff (1991) 
suggest that financial statements should be viewed as a joint statement from the audit firm and the 
company’s management. Consistently, Knechel (2009) state that audit quality as an outcome should not be 
separated from reporting quality, and Dechow et al. (2010) further claim that higher earnings quality 
provides relevant information to any decision that depends on an informative representation of financial 
performance. Under this argument, several authors measured audit quality through the informativeness of 
reported earnings. Several indicators of earnings quality have been used by researchers, which can be 
categorized into three broad categories: properties of earnings (including earnings persistence and 
smoothness, timely loss recognition, the magnitude of accruals and target beating), investor responsiveness 
to earnings, and external indicators of earnings misstatements (Dechow et al., 2010). Table 7 provides a 
synthesis of studies that linked the concept of audit quality directly to the financial reporting quality of audit 
clients. 
Table 7. Output–based measures of audit quality (AQ) – Financial reporting quality 
AQ 
Measure  
Purpose U.S. Studies 
International Studies 
Main Findings 











Johnson et al. 
(2002) 
   
 
No significant association was found between long audit 
















1) Auditor tenure 
Gul et al. 
(2007) 
 
 It were found higher levels of earnings management but 
only in the early years of the auditor-client relationship, 
and not when auditor tenure was long.  
Manry et al. 
(2008)  
 
 As audit partner tenure increases, auditors became less 
willing to accept abnormal accruals, but only for small 
client firms. 
Davis et al. 
(2009) 
 
 The use of abnormal accruals to meet/beat earnings 
forecasts increased in both the early and later years of the 
auditor-client relationship. In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley 
period, the described relationship was not observed. 
 Jeong and Rho 
(2004) – Korean 
listed firms 
 Audit firm rotation (non-Big N to Big N auditors and 
vice versa) did not produce higher earnings quality to 
client firms. 
 
Chi and Huang 
(2005) – Taiwan 
firms 
 Audit-partner tenure or audit-firm tenure produced 
higher quality of financial reporting, but the cut-off point 
of positive effects was about five years. 
 




Jackson et al. 
(2008) - Australian 
listed firms 
 
No significant association was found between long audit 
partner tenure and higher abnormal accruals.  
 
Chen et al. (2008) 
- Taiwan firms  
 Discretionary accruals values decreased significantly 
with both audit firm and audit partner tenure.  
 





Audit partner rotation produced higher quality of 
reported earnings but only in the initial years of tenure. 
Audit firm rotation produced lower earnings quality. 
 
Chi et al. (2009) – 
Taiwan listed 
firms 
 No significant differences were found in abnormal 
accruals between firms with mandatory partner rotation 
and firms from a non-rotation sample. 




Table 7. Output–based measures of audit quality (AQ) – Financial reporting quality - Continued 
AQ 
Measure  



















   
 
 









 No evidence was found of a significant association between 
abnormal accruals and audit client’s economic importance. 
Hoitash et al. 
(2007) 
 
 It was found a significant positive association between 
audit fees and abnormal accruals. 
3) Provision of 
non-audit 
services 
Frankel et al. 
(2002) – listed 
firms;  
Gul et al. 
(2007); 




It was found a positive association between the level of 
non-audit services and the clients’ levels of abnormal 
accruals. 
Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003); 
Antle et al. 
(2006) – listed 
firms 
Antle et al. (2006) – 
UK listed firms; 
Ruddock et al. 
(2006) - Australian 
listed firms 
 
Earnings quality was not significantly reduced as non-audit 
services increased. 




  The firms’ noncompliance with accounting disclosure 
requirements decreased as one moves from non-Big N to 
Big N auditors. 
Francis and Yu 
(2009) 
 
 Clients of larger offices of Big N auditors evidenced less 
aggressive earnings management behaviour, as opposed to 
small offices of Big N auditors.  
Choi et al. 
(2010) 
 
 Audit office size had a significantly negative relation with 
earnings management, even after controlling for national-
level audit firm size and office-level industry expertise. 
Frankel et al. 
(2002) – listed 
firms; 
Antle et al. 
(2006) – listed 
firms;  
Boone et al. 
(2010) 
Bauwhede et al. 
(2003) – Belgium 
listed firms; 
 Bauwhede and 
Willekens (2004) - 
Belgium firms;  
Jeong and Rho 
(2004) – Korean 
listed firms 
 
No significant differences were found between earnings 
management of Big N and non-Big N auditors’ clients.  
  





Clients of Big N auditors presented lower levels of earnings 
management. 






 Big N auditors who were both national and city-specific 
industry specialists had clients with the lowest abnormal 
accrual. 
  





Clients of industry specialist auditors presented higher 
financial reporting quality, when compared with clients of 
non-specialist auditors. The impact of auditor industry 
specialization on earnings quality increased as the legal 
environment weakens. 
6) Characteristics 
of the auditors’ 
client portfolio 
 
Gaeremynck et al. 
(2008) – Belgium 
firms 
 For a sample of financial distressed firms, the audit-firm 
portfolio characteristics (client visibility and solvency) 
better explain variations in client financial reporting quality 
than the traditionally used Big N indicator variable. 
7) Litigation risk 
 
Venkataraman 




It was found a negative relation between abnormal accruals 
and higher-litigation risk. 
Fafatas (2010)  
 Auditors implicated in audit failure events occurred in the 
post-Enron and SOX period enforced a decline in clients’ 





Kim and Yi (2009) – 
Korean listed firms 
 Level of abnormal accruals was significantly lower for 
firms whose auditors were designated by the regulatory, 
than for firms with free selected of auditors.  











In countries with a Big N auditors’ market concentration, 
clients of Big N auditors had higher earnings quality. Yet, 
in countries with a higher concentration within the Big N 
group of auditors, clients of Big N auditors had lower 
earnings quality (compared to those with less concentration 
within the Big N auditors).  
Big N auditors’ control of audit market by itself does not 
harm audit quality, but concentration within the dominant 
Big N group of auditors may be harmful to audit quality. 
Note: Whenever there is no reference of the type of firms, it means authors used unlisted companies.                                             
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The quality of reported earnings has been used to capture audit quality in a diversity of contexts, 
particularly, in tests of perceived threats to audit quality, related with auditor tenure, client economic 
importance, and the provision of non-audit services. Most studies in literature also used earnings quality in 
tests of supply drivers of audit quality, namely those related with auditors’ reputation (size), competence 
and exposure to legal liabilities.  
When compared with U.S. studies, there is a higher prevalence of international studies, namely from 
Australia and Asiatic countries, that used earnings quality as a proxy for audit quality and examined the 
perceived threats arising from auditor tenure. Nevertheless, U.S. and international single country studies, 
in general, consistently indicated that there is no significant association between long periods of audit 
partner/audit firm tenure and lower financial reporting quality (Johnson et al., 2002; Carey and Simnett, 
2006; Gul et al., 2007; Jackson et al., 2008; Chi et al., 2009), or even revealed that financial reporting 
quality increases with auditor tenure (Chi and Huang, 2005; Chen et al., 2008; Manry et al., 2008). Studies 
from outside the U.S. further reported that audit firm/audit partner rotation did not promote higher earnings 
quality to client firms (Jeong and Rho, 2004; Fargher et al., 2008; Chi et al., 2009). While we have verified 
a line of consistency in the findings of U.S. and international (single country) studies, and that the benefits 
of long periods of auditor/audit firm tenure on financial reporting quality seem to overcome those of 
auditor/audit firm rotation, there are important issues that we must keep in mind when analysing this type 
of research. First, despite, in general, all the studies controlled in their models for a set of client firm 
characteristics related with age, size, leverage and financial performance, and for audit firm size and audit 
pricing, some studies were performed at the audit partner level (of tenure or rotation), while others used the 
audit firm level. Second, these research-type models should control for endogenous auditor choice. Third, 
all the studies are from single countries that impose limitations on the length of audit partner tenure, but no 
limits on the length of audit firm tenure (U.S., Australia, Taiwan and Korea – for details see Lennox et al. 
(2014)). Therefore, future research should explore the effects of auditor/audit firm tenure/rotation on 
financial reporting quality in jurisdictions where there are no rotation rules for auditors, namely in emerging 
markets, or where there are both engagement partner and audit firm rotation rules (EU Member States). 
Cross-country studies that control for countries’ institutional features are also necessary. 
Regarding the tests of perceived threats to financial reporting related to client economic importance, 
the U.S. studies (Reinolds and Francis, 2001; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Hoitash et al., 2007) provided 
mixed results. The evidence on the threats imposed by the provision of non-audit services is also mixed. 
While two U.S. studies (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Antle et al., 2006) and two international single country 
studies from UK (Antle et al. (2006) and Australia (Ruddock et al., 2006) concluded that earnings quality 
was not significantly reduced by the provision of non-audit services to audit clients, Frankel et al. (2002), 
Gul et al. (2007) and Lim and Tang (2008) used U.S. data and found a negative association between the 
level of non-audit services and the clients’ financial reporting quality. As we discussed previously, the 
inconsistencies in the results may be driven by the different levels that may be used when computing 
variables related with audit and non-audit fees (the audit firm-level, audit office-level, or engagement 
partner-level). Future research should account for this issue, also control for the effects of firms’ corporate 
governance mechanisms on financial reporting quality, and expand to cross-country studies (that control 
for country-level institutional characteristics).        
A subset of the literature has also indirectly captured auditor incentives to supply higher financial 
reporting quality, using auditors’ size and industry specialization. Studies analysing the effects of auditors’ 
size on financial reporting quality have yielded to inconsistent results. Several U.S. studies generally 
indicated that clients of large auditors present higher earnings quality (Krishnan and Schauer, 2000; Francis 
and Yu, 2009; Choi et al., 2010). Kwon et al. (2007) found similar evidence using data from several 
countries. Nevertheless, three studies from the U.S. (Frankel et al., 2002; Antle et al., 2006; Boone et al., 
2010) and three international studies with data from Belgian and Korea (Bauwhede et al., 2003; Bauwhede 
and Willekens, 2004; Jeong and Rho, 2004) revealed no significant differences in earnings quality between 
clients of Big N and non-Big N auditors. An issue that can contribute to the mixed results is the computation 
of the variable representing the audit firm size. While the majority of the studies used the dichotomy Big 
N/non-Big N auditors, two U.S. studies used the audit office-level to compute auditors’ size (Francis and 
Yu, 2009; Choi et al., 2010). According to Reinolds and Francis (2001), Francis and Yu (2009) and Choi 
et al. (2010), the examination of individual practices offices is of fundamental importance because this is 
where audit contracting occurs and where auditors make decisions with respect to the audited financial 
28 
statements of clients. DeFond and Zhang (2014) further highlight that audit office-level offers the 
possibility of capturing within-firm differentials in terms of audit quality.  
Concerning the effects of auditors’ industry specialization, evidence collected by a U.S. (Reichelt and 
Wang, 2010) and a cross-country study (Kwon et al., 2007) consistently supported that clients of industry 
specialist auditors present higher financial reporting quality. DeFond and Zhang (2014) indicate that a 
criticism of this type of research is that it makes a strong assumption about the mechanisms through which 
specialization improves audit quality, by assuming that industry-specific knowledge is transferrable across 
clients, personnel and over time, which requires sophisticated knowledge management systems. These 
research models are also highly sensitive to the type of auditors’ industry specialization variables that are 
used (Audousset-Coulier et al., 2016).  
Up to 2010 we only found a cross-country study that simultaneously tested the effects of auditors’ 
industry specialization and size in financial reporting quality (Kwon et al., 2007). Kwon et al. (2007) 
controlled for several firms’ characteristics (such as size, age, leverage, financial performance), but 
concerning the countries institutional features, they only included a variable related with the country’s legal 
system (law enforcement and outside investor rights). Thus, future research in cross-country studies should 
further control for country-level economic, regulatory, political, cultural and religious factors that may 
affect the financial reporting system. According to Boone et al. (2010), research models examining the 
effects of supply drivers of audit quality associated with auditors’ size and industry specialization may 
suffer from omitted variables bias, from spurious correlation, or from endogenous auditor choice. DeFond 
and Zhang (2014) argue that studies revealing a positive effect of auditor size and industry expertise on 
earnings quality can be explained by self-selection, because it may be that large and industry specialist 
auditors choose less risky clients.Therefore, additional research that controls for endogeneity issues is 
recommended.  
Our review also includes studies that primarily focus on auditors’ incentives for independence (and 
audit quality) arising from litigation risk and exposure to legal liabilities. DeFond and Zhang (2014) indicate 
that litigation damage claims against auditors can be large enough to threaten the viability even of the 
largest audit firms, and thus are expected to have significant incentive effects. Consistently, both U.S. and 
international studies generally confirmed that higher-litigation regimes and exposure to legal liabilities are 
an incentive to supply higher levels of audit quality (Venkataraman et al., 2008; Kim and Yi, 2009; Fafatas, 
2010). This is an interesting area for future research, namely exploring, through cross-country studies, how 
different auditing litigation regimes (measured by different aspects of legal environments) impact on 
financial reporting quality, while controlling for other country-level institutional characteristics. 
Our final reference is to a cross-country study of Francis (2011b) that related financial reporting quality 
and audit market structure.13 Francis used data on listed firms from 40 countries and concluded that the 
dominance of the audit market by the Big N auditors by itself does not harm audit quality, but concentration 
within the dominant Big N group of auditors may be detrimental to audit quality. This study is of extreme 
importance to audit quality literature given the major concerns that have been expressed worldwide over 
the domination of the audit market by Big N auditors. U.S. and European superior government bodies warn 
that concentration of supply in audit markets can be harmful for audit quality, because the lack of 
competition reduces the incentives of Big N auditors to conduct high-quality audits (Francis et al., 2013).  
In summary, there is an important research stream that examines audit quality by considering the overall 
quality of financial reporting quality. This type of research assumes that audited financial statements are a 
joint product of both the manager’s and the auditor’s work (Antle and Nalebuff, 1991). As reported by 
DeFond and Zhang (2014), this close link has made financial reporting quality an intuitively appealing 
proxy to measure audit quality.  
Given that no comprehensive or generally accepted measure of earnings quality exists, researchers have 
examined various dimensions of earnings quality (Knechel et al., 2013). While financial reporting quality 
is conceptually broad, auditing researchers have primarily used earnings quality measures designed to 
detect opportunistic earnings management, motivated by the assumption that high quality auditing 
constrains opportunistic behaviours over financial reporting (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). The most 
frequently used measures include earnings persistence and smoothness, timely loss recognition, the 
magnitude of accruals and target beating (Dechow et al., 2010). 
DeFond and Zhang (2014) highlight that financial reporting quality measures have several advantages 
that make them attractive candidates for capturing audit quality. In particular, earnings quality proxies 
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capture the quality of accounting information and of the audit process in a general sense, and, thus, they are 
conceptually suitable for measuring audit quality (Choi et al., 2010; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Another 
advantage of the earnings quality measures is that they are expected to detect within GAAP earnings 
manipulation, which is likely to represent the qualitative aspects of management’s accounting choices that 
reflect potential bias in management's judgments that auditors are required to evaluate (DeFond and Zhang, 
2014). Also, the continuous nature of earnings quality measures captures variations in audit quality even in 
studies that are restricted to relatively small samples, and within the subset of clients who do not have 
egregiously poor audit quality (Francis, 2011a; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). As stated by Francis (2011a), 
all companies have financial statements and there is potentially far greater cross-sectional variation earnings 
quality, which creates more powerful research designs. Thus, cross-country studies is a suitable context to 
use earnings quality as a proxy for audit quality (while controlling for country-level institutional features).  
While earnings quality measures are widely used by researchers to compute audit quality and present 
several advantages, it could be argued that earnings quality metrics are not an appropriate measure of audit 
quality (Francis, 2011a). 
Dechow et al. (2010) and DeFond and Zhang (2014) highlight that financial reporting quality is 
determined by the firm’s financial reporting system, which maps its underlying economics into the financial 
reports, and by the firm’s innate characteristics, which determine its underlying economics. In other words, 
together, the firm’s financial reporting system and innate characteristics affect the quality of the pre-audited 
financial statements, and, accordingly, higher audit quality reflects the greater assurance that the financial 
statements faithfully reflect the firm’s underlying economics, conditioned on its financial reporting system 
and innate characteristics (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Consistently, because it is inextricably intertwined 
with financial reporting quality, audit quality also depends a firms’ innate characteristics and financial 
reporting systems, and, therefore, it is critically important for empirical models of audit quality to 
disentangle these constructs (Knechel, 2009; DeFond and Zhang, 2014). According to Dechow et al. (2010) 
and DeFond and Zhang (2014), all the proxies for earnings quality are affected by both fundamental 
performance and its measurement, and by firms’ innate characteristics, although not equally, and, therefore, 
they do not measure the same underlying construct. Dechow et al. (2010) further claim that the earnings 
quality measures focus on different elements of decision usefulness of the information and, so, they should 
not be expected to perform equally well under all circumstances. Finally, DeFond and Zhang (2014) argue 
that earnings quality measures tend to have high measurement error and even bias and that there is little 
consensus on how these proxies should be measured.  
As reported by Perotti and Wagenhofer (2014), since earnings quality is not directly observable, the 
literature has developed a variety of proxies for earnings quality, most of them based on intuitive and 
plausible concepts about desirable characteristics of an accounting system. However, although the measures 
are intended to capture the same fundamental construct, they correlate only weakly and this raises the 
question of which measure to use in a particular research design, and is likely to have a significant impact 
on the results. Perotti and Wagenhofer (2014) claim that there is little guidance as to how good the proxies 
for earnings quality really are and what the best measure in any given circumstance might be. 
 
Perception-based measures of audit quality 
 
By way of taking a different line to the studies presented in the prior sections, several authors analysed 
audit quality using perception-based measures. While users’ perception on audit quality plays a critical role 
in maintaining systemic confidence in the integrity of financial accounting reports, prior research that 
evaluates audit quality from a stakeholder perspective is relatively sparse (Boone et al., 2008). Under this 
research perspective, our review includes studies that used single proxies as user perceptions of audit 
quality, such as audit client equity risk premium, bid-ask spread or earnings response coefficients (ERC), 
and other studies that used a multidimensional construct based on users’ perceptions on several attributes 







Table 8. Output–based measures of audit quality (AQ) – Perception-based measures  
AQ Measure  Purpose U.S. Studies 
International Studies 






perceptions  on 
Audit Quality 
To analyse the relation 
between perceptions 
of audit quality and:  
Ghosh and 
Moon (2005) 
– listed firms 
 
 Long periods of audit firm tenure positively affected 








Boone et al. 
(2008) 
 
 The equity risk premium of audit clients decreased in 
the early years of tenure but increased with additional 
years of tenure. Overall, the cost of capital decreased 
with long periods of audit firm tenure.  
Dao et al. 
(2008) 
 
 The shareholder votes against auditor ratification were 
positively correlated with auditor tenure. Long periods 
of auditor tenure adversely affects audit quality. 
 





 It was not found support for the belief that mandatory 
audit partner rotation enhances investor perceptions of 
audit quality. ERC values were not significantly 
different between samples of firms with/without audit 
firm rotation. 
2) provision of non-
audit services  
Lim and Tang 
(2008)  
 
 Audit quality increased (higher ERCs) with the level 
of non-audit services acquired from industry specialist 
auditors when compared to non-specialist auditors. 









Clients of industry specialist auditors presented higher 
ERCs than clients of non-specialist auditors.  
The impact of auditors’ industry specialization on 





 A sufficiently long industry specialist auditor-client 
tenure improved the disclosure quality (the client bid-
ask spread).  
Multidimensional 
construct based 
on shareholders  
perceptions  on 
several audit 
quality attributes 
To explore the 
relationship between 
audit quality and:   
 










It was found evidence that audit quality declines with 
the length of auditor tenure. 






 Evidence showed that initial audits were associated 
with lower fees, higher audit hours and higher audit 
quality. 






et al. (2007)   
 
 Specialist auditors were positively associated with 
perceived audit quality.  
Big N auditors were not uniformly associated with 
increased perceived audit quality. 
To study the relation 
between audit quality 
attributes and audit 
clients satisfaction 




 Client satisfaction was significantly related to 
auditors’ competence, experience and independence 
attributes. 
To analyse how 
external users and 
auditors evaluate 












Auditors’ technical competence (and experience) and 
independence features were perceived as very 







Auditor’s skeptical attitude, independence and 
industry knowledge were perceived as very important 
aspects of audit quality.  
 Duff (2004) 
 Auditors’ technical quality dimensions of reputation 
and capability were perceived by users as very 
important audit quality attributes. 
Note: Whenever there is no reference of the type of firms, it means authors used unlisted companies.                                           
Although it is recognised that the stakeholders’ perception of audit quality plays a critical role in 
maintaining market systemic confidence in the truthfulness of the financial reporting system, studies that 
examined audit quality from a stakeholder perspective are limited (Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Boone et al., 
2008). Ghosh and Moon (2005) argue that this type of research is necessary as it provides valuable insights 
into how capital market participants perceive the effects of auditors’ independence and competence on audit 
quality. 
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As we can see from Table 8, up to 2010 we found five U.S. studies and two international studies (one 
cross-country study) that analysed the relationship between market-based perceptions of earnings quality 
(and audit quality) and variables that are traditionally linked with auditors’ independence and competence. 
Overall, those studies suggest that long periods of audit firm tenure positively affect the market perceptions 
of earnings quality (Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Boone et al., 2008; Chi et al., 2009), and that auditors’ industry 
specialization acts as a spillover of users’ perceptions of earnings quality and audit quality (Kwon et al., 
2007; Lim and Tang, 2008; Almutairi et al., 2009). The evidence collected from the cross-country study of 
Kwon et al. (2007), highlights, however, that the impact of auditor industry specialization on users’ 
perceptions of earnings quality is dependent on the country’s legal environment.   
A key point in this type of research is that the findings must be interpreted with caution, because they 
critically depend on the ability of market-based proxies (ERC, client equity risk premium, or bid-ask 
spread) to capture perceived audit quality (Chi et al., 2009). As acknowledged by Lim and Tang (2008) and 
Chi et al. (2009), although widely used in the accounting literature, market-based proxies for perceived 
audit quality can be noisy measures, which weakens the inferences. Furthermore, the research models 
examining the effects of auditors’ competence and independence on users’ perceptions of earnings quality 
may suffer from endogeneity bias, especially, from endogenous auditor choice (Kwon et al., 2007). Thus, 
additional research in this area is recommended, namely, studies using several alternative market-based 
measures of perceived audit quality, and cross-country studies that control for endogeneity concerns, and 
for several country-level institutional characteristics that may affect the stakeholders’ perceptions about the 
quality of the financial reporting system and, by consequence, audit quality. 
Table 8 also reports several studies that used multidimensional constructs to measure users’ perceptions 
of audit quality. Those studies view audit quality from a behavioural perspective and usually identify 
attributes that are perceived by financial preparers, auditors, and other users as being related to audit quality, 
and then create constructs of audit quality (i.e., audit quality is measured by using multi-attribute models). 
In 1982, a seminal study from Mock and Samet (in Duff, 2004: 21) drafted a list of 110 factors related to 
audit quality (derived from Statements on Auditing Standards, Statements on Quality Control Standards, 
peer review manuals, and firm quality control standards) that were then reviewed by a group of auditors. 
This process reduced the 110 factors to a 32-item questionnaire used for evaluating audit quality. Several 
authors followed the Mock and Samet’s method and evaluated perceptions of audit quality among different 
groups of stakeholders. Duff (2009) highlights that multidimensional constructs of audit quality include 
common elements but these constructs are also used with little reference to one another. Our review includes 
several U.S. (Schroeder et al., 1986; Carcello et al., 1992; Behn et al., 1997; Lowensohn et al., 2007) and 
international studies (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; Warming-Rasmussen and Jensen, 1998; Duff, 2004, 
2009; Takiah et al., 2010) that followed this approach and, interestingly, they consistently indicate that 
auditors’ technical competence, experience and independence attributes were systematically perceived by 
users as very important dimensions of audit quality. It was also interesting to note that a U.S. and an 
international study consistently reported that Big N auditors were not uniformly perceived by users as 
associated with higher audit quality (Lowensohn et al., 2007; Takiah et al., 2010). These findings are 
important as they report a consistent pattern about the attributes that are perceived by the U.S. and 
international users as the most important dimensions of audit quality.  
Studies using multidimensional constructs to access the stakeholders’ perceptions of audit quality offer 
a different, but very interesting, perspective of audit quality. As stated by Pratt (2009), this type of study 
allows the researcher to better understand the world from the perspective of those studied, and to examine 
real-life processes. It is especially suitable for studying the complexities of expert practices like auditing, 
allowing the researcher to develop insights into the backstage of expertise (Cooper and Morgan, 2008). It 
also has the potential to generate rich descriptions of processes and grounded categorizations that are useful 
for quantitatively oriented studies, allowing researchers to develop new concepts, refine existing ones, and 
identify novel relationships and trends for further testing (Power and Gendron, 2015). Future research in 
auditing should explore this “constructivist spirit” of analysis, where auditing is viewed as a practice with 
a high degree of unique and specific features that vary widely (Power and Gendron, 2015). Recently, several 
global initiatives have developed audit quality frameworks which are essentially based on key indicators of 
audit quality (IAASB, 2014; PCAOB, 2015; CAQ, 2016), revealing the importance of using 
multidimensional constructs of audit quality in identifying the most effective ways to determine and assess 
audit quality. 
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4. Conclusion  
In this study we review critically three decades of literature (1980-2010) with a primary focus on audit 
quality. We first discuss audit quality conceptualization, and then, grounded on the DeFond and Zhang 
(2014) framework, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the most used measures of audit quality, under 
the perspective of the U.S. versus international studies. 
Regarding the concept of audit quality, and consistent with Knechel et al. (2013), we conclude that past 
attempts to define audit quality have failed to produce a consensual and universally accepted definition. 
Audit quality is, in essence, a complex and multi-faceted concept, with two critical attributes, its inherent 
uncertainty and idiosyncrasy (Knechel, 2009). Given the difficulties in defining audit quality, exploring the 
context and relevance of certain indicators has been critical to obtain a deeper understanding of the quality 
of a particular audit, even if those indicators do not provide a holistic understanding of audit quality (CAQ, 
2016).  
The input-based measures essentially reflect individual characteristics of auditors and audit teams, such 
as knowledge, expertise and professional skepticism. Yet, as Knechel et al. (2013) noted, the riskiness of 
audits and the idiosyncratic nature of audit engagements lead to no prescribed level of inputs to yield a 
desired level of audit assurance. We find that most of the research located in the input-based measures of 
audit quality has been concentrated on the auditor-client contracting features (in particular, audit fees) and 
auditors’ brand name, while auditors’ industry experience has only began to be used as a surrogate of audit 
quality since the 2000s. We conclude that there is a lack of research exploring measures of audit quality 
based on audit effort. As Simmnet et al. (2016) argued, information on audit effort has the ability to provide 
evidence-based results that are of fundamental importance to audit quality, such as the auditors’ approach 
to deal with clients with different risk profiles, the role of the engagement partner, the review partner, the 
senior manager, or the audit team composition. 
Our review indicates that there is not a general consensus inside the U.S. studies and across international 
studies about the existence of a Big N auditor fee premium, and a cross-country study even demonstrated 
that the fee premiums of Big N auditors became smaller as the countries’ legal and regulatory regimes 
changed from weaker to stronger regimes. Concerning the effect of auditors’ industry specialization on 
audit pricing, the evidence of U.S. and international studies is also not consensual, but there is some 
consistency between U.S. and Australian data revealing that only jointly national and city-specific industry 
leadership results in an audit fee premium for Big N auditors. A cross-country study concluded that there 
are returns to global audit firm networks from investments in industry specializations and significant fee 
premiums for national industry leaders, and that the national U.S. auditors’ industry leaders also receive 
fee premiums from outside the U.S. market.  
We also verify that both U.S. and international studies capture the demand for high audit quality through 
auditor-specific characteristics (namely, auditors’ brand name and industry expertise). Yet, while the U.S. 
studies mostly analyse factors that drive the client’s demand for audit quality related to agency costs, market 
reactions, investment opportunities, financing decisions and financial reporting quality, the international 
studies (including cross-country studies) are typically located in demand drivers related to financial 
reporting quality. While U.S. and international single country studies largely support the notion that Big N 
auditors tend to promote the quality of financial reporting of their clients, the cross-country studies provide 
no evidence of such an international effect, and suggest that it is the strength of the countries’ legal and 
regulatory systems that explains the Big N auditor effect on audit quality. Our review also reveals that there 
is not a consensus between U.S. and international single country studies over the idea that industry specialist 
auditors promote earnings quality.  
The output-based measures of audit quality assume that audit quality is related to the probability that 
financial statements contain no material misstatements. The most used output-based proxies are the 
auditors’ litigation activities, PCAOB inspections reports, accounting restatements, audit reports, financial 
reporting quality, and perception-based measures. We find that most of the research using output-based 
measures of audit quality, has been centralised in proxies based on audit reporting and financial reporting 
quality, and that this is a research branch that has begun to be explored essentially since the 2000s. 
Our review shows a higher concentration of U.S. studies using auditors’ litigation activities as a 
surrogate of audit quality, and a lack of international studies in this area. This is explained by differences 
in the legal systems worldwide, which provide a scenario wherein auditors face more exposure to litigation 
33 
in common law countries, and less direct legal exposure in code law countries such as Continental Europe 
(Francis, 2011a). In the U.S., factors that mostly seem to cause litigation actions against auditors are 
essentially related to the client firm’s financial condition and to weak quality control or risky practices 
within audit firms. 
Though many countries worldwide have established public oversight systems of auditors, the PCAOB 
inspections reports are those that have mostly been used to signal audit quality, since PCAOB inspects both 
U.S. and non-U.S. registered auditing firms. Research on PCAOB inspections has been essentially centered 
on the effects of PCAOB’s inspection program in the U.S., and, while some studies suggest that PCAOB 
inspections stimulate improvements in audit quality and have been beneficial to the audit profession, other 
studies indicate that the PCAOB inspection process has been penalizing for audit firms. Regarding the 
PCAOB international inspection program, up to 2010, we did not find any study. Only recently, a few 
studies have started to investigate this issue.  
Another indicator that has been used as a proxy for negative audit quality is the presence of accounting 
restatements. Our review shows that studies using restatements as an outcome of audit quality come mainly 
from the U.S., and up to 2010, we only found two international studies, from Taiwan. Studies from the U.S. 
and Taiwan consistently reported that the occurrence of restatements is negatively related with auditor 
industry expertise and the experience of the audit team. U.S. studies further revealed that the event of 
restatements is negatively associated with auditor tenure, but they are not consensual on whether audit fees 
are related to restatements.  
Prior research has also used the accuracy of audit reporting and the financial reporting quality of audit 
clients as measures of audit quality.  
Our synthesis reveals that the effect of auditor tenure on the accuracy of audit reports and earnings 
quality has been mainly analysed by international single country studies, and that the evidence collected by 
those studies mostly indicates that the benefits of long periods of auditor tenure on audit reports and on 
financial reporting seem to overcome those of auditors’ rotation. The persistence of international studies 
(compared to U.S. studies) analysing the relationship between audit reporting and financial reporting 
accuracy and auditor tenure seems to be explained by regulatory changes to audit partner/audit firm rotation 
that have occurred worldwide, and in particular in the European context, over the last ten years. The 
accuracy of audit reports and of financial reporting has been also used by several U.S. and international 
(single country) studies, in tests of perceived threats to audit quality, related to client economic importance, 
and the provision of non-audit services, but the evidence collected is not consensual.  
Prior studies have further analysed whether audit reporting accuracy and earnings quality depends on 
auditors’ brand name and industry expertise. In light of the evidence collected by U.S. and international 
single country studies, auditors’ brand name, per se, seems not to be consistently a relevant driver of audit 
reporting quality and of the clients’ earnings quality. Yet, two cross-country studies, found evidence that 
Big N auditors promote quality of financial reporting of their clients, and that global audit firm networks 
provide a more consistent approach to the application of going concern audit reporting standards. Regarding 
industry expertise, U.S. studies and a cross-country study consistently indicate that auditors’ industry 
expertise seems to act as a spillover of the accuracy of audit reports and of financial reporting.  
Under the output-based measures, several studies have also analysed audit quality through users’ 
perceptions. On the one hand, we found five U.S. studies and two international studies (one cross-country 
study) that linked market-based perceptions of earnings quality to variables that are traditionally linked 
with auditors’ independence and competence, overall suggesting that long periods of audit firm tenure and 
auditors’ industry expertise have a positive influence on the market-based perceptions of earnings quality. 
On the other hand, several studies used multidimensional constructs to access users’ perceptions of audit 
quality. While we report a lack of research evaluating audit quality from a stakeholder viewpoint 
(qualitative perspective), our review allows us to conclude that U.S. and international studies consistently 
indicate that auditors’ technical competence, experience and independence attributes are systematically 
perceived by users as very important dimensions of audit quality.  
Finally, while we note that the proxies used by researchers to capture audit quality are indirect and have 
inherent limitations, we acknowledge that due to the lack of ability to observe audit quality, combining 
multiple proxies can be the best solution to capturing audit quality, and therefore reducing the impact of 
the intrinsic limitations of each individual proxy and taking advantage of their strengths. Furthermore, 
future research should rely on qualitative measures of audit quality, which allows researchers to better 
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understand the world from the perspective of those studied and to examine real-life auditing processes 
(Pratt, 2009). This type of research may generate rich descriptions of processes and grounded 
categorizations useful for quantitatively studies, allowing the development of new concepts (or refining the 
existing ones), and identify novel relationships and trends for further testing (Power and Gendron, 2015).  
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1 See: https://www.ifac.org/about-ifac/membership/member-organizations-and-country-profiles; https://pcaobus.org/Standards; 
http://www.aicpa.org/RESEARCH/STANDARDS/AUDITATTEST/ASB/Pages/AuditingStandardsBoard.aspx. 
2 The major concerns related to the measures of auditor industry specialization are discussed in the next subsection. 
3 In a cross-country study based on data from 15 emergent countries, Michas (2011) explored whether the country-level development of the 
audit profession is associated with audit quality and auditor choice. After controlling for many other country and company-level characteristics, 
he found evidence that audit quality is higher in countries with more developed audit professions, but only for clients of Big N auditors, and 
that the likelihood that a client company hires a Big N auditor is positively associated with audit profession development. We do not include 
the Michas’s (2011) study in main analysis because it falls out of the time period of our literature review (1980-2010). 
4 In a very recent cross-country study based on data from 37 countries, El Ghoul et al. (2016), used regressions that control for country, industry, 
and year fixed effects as well as other firm-level determinants, and they find evidence that corporate equity financing worldwide is cheaper 
when Big N auditors monitor the financial reporting process, although this relation is weaker outside the U.S. where the implicit insurance 
coverage that auditors afford investors is much lower. As in prior studies, they suggest that the strength of the countries’ legal and regulatory 
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systems is the factor explaining the role of Big N auditors in terms of equity pricing. The El Ghoul et al. (2016) study was not included in main 
analysis because it falls out of the time period of our literature review. 
5 The European Commission Green Paper (EU, 2010) argues that within the European market for audit services, it appears that there is a higher 
level of “comfort” with the appointment of a Big Four auditor, namely by the the largest companies. Yet, the EC would like to understand how 
much of this is attributable to “perceptions” or to the “merit” of the Big Four auditors. 
6 See: https://www.ifiar.org. 
7 See: https://pcaobus.org. 
8 Some recent studies analysed the effectiveness of the PCAOB’s inspection of non-U.S. auditors. However we do not include these studies in 
our main analysis because they fall out of the time period of the literature review (1980-2010). 
Bishop et al. (2013) provided descriptive analyses on the results of inspections for international audit firms, noting that approximately one-half 
of the inspection reports identify audit deficiencies and two-thirds identify quality control defects, and also that affiliates of Big N auditors are 
less likely to have deficiencies than are other firms. Song and Ye (2014) analysed 1,604 clients of non-U.S. audit firms and found a significantly 
low rate of clients that dismissed their auditors within one year following the disclosure of audit deficiencies in PCAOB reports. They also 
reported a low rate of non-U.S auditor resignation cases and deregistration from PCAOB. 
Krishnan et al. (2014) found that the clients of PCAOB inspected non-U.S. auditors have lower abnormal accruals. Similarly, Shroff (2015) 
and Fung et al. (2016) showed that the PCAOB inspections of non-U.S. auditors increase the reporting quality of all clients audited by a non-
U.S. auditor. Lamoreaux (2016) further reported that non-U.S. auditors are more likely to issue going concern opinions and report internal 
control weaknesses following an increase in the threat of a PCAOB inspection. 
9 See the SEC’s Final Rule: Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, at http:// 
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8400.html. 
10 Information on Audit Analytics coverage available in http://www.auditanalytics.com/doc/AA_Audit_Compliance_ds.pdf 
11 In a recent cross-country study Srinivasan et al. (2015) analysed the frequency of restatements by foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges, 
based on U.S.-listed foreign firms from 51 countries. They found evidence that the restatement rate of U.S.-listed foreign firms is significantly 
lower than that of comparable U.S. firms and that the difference depends on the firm’s home country characteristics. Foreign firms from 
countries with a weak rule of law were less likely to restate than are firms from strong rule of law countries. Since this study falls out of the 
time period of our literature review, it was not included in main analysis. 
12 The Regulation No 537/2014 of 16 April of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU, 2014), requires Member States to impose 
mandatory audit firm rotation on public interest companies after June 2016. 
13 We include the study of Francis (2011b) in Table 7 because despite the publication date of the document is 2011 a preliminary version had 
been made available up to 2010. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2009 European Auditing Research Network Conference, 
the 2010 International Symposium on Audit Research, the 2010 EIASM/Bocconi University Workshop on Audit Quality, and the 2010 Annual 
Meeting of the American Accounting Association.  
